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Abstract 
 
We propose that culture matters in finance. In this dissertation we study the relationship 
between national culture and financialization. To date the concept and definition of 
financialization has largely been theoretical, with little empirical research. Grappling with this 
reality, we draw from a combination of orthodox and heterodox literature to bring the concept 
into the realms of rigorous empirical analysis.    
Using the findings of Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) and Arcand et al. (2015) we 
assume and argue that financialization commences when domestic credit to private sector (% 
of GDP) exceeds 80%.  Considering the aforementioned findings, we assume that 
financialization is the advanced state of financial development. We divide our data into two 
main cross-sections based on this criterion. The first being a general group of 55 countries, and 
the second a sample of 30 considered to be experiencing financialization.  
We employ four of Hofstede (1980) cultural dimensions to examine if national culture 
has a role in financial development and financialization. For robustness we consider primary 
religion as an alternative proxy for national culture, (Stulz and Williamson, 2003). 
Our results show that there is a statistically significant negative relationship between 
financial development and power distance. Overall, there is no evidence to suggest that 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions explain the relationship between national culture and 
financialization. Nevertheless, using primary religion to test robustness, we see that national 
culture has some explanatory power in both financialization and financial development. We 
find that in countries with predominant Muslim populations there is strong evidence of less 
financial development and financialization. In the vein of Stulz and Williamson (2003), we 
conclude that primary religion has a profound role in informing the financial development 
trajectory of a nation.  
 
JEL Codes: O170; O570; Z130 
 
Keywords: Financialization, Financial Development, Cultural Dimensions, Cross-Country 
Analysis 
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1. Introduction 
 
 In this dissertation we investigate the relationship between national culture and 
financialization. One of the pioneering studies of cultural finance, Stulz and Williamson (2003), 
claims that there are three channels in which culture impacts financial outcomes. First, the 
values which are predominant in a country are informed by its culture. This affects things such 
as the charging of interest, which varies based on religion. Second, culture directly affects 
institutions. The legal system of a country is developed by its cultural values. Third, culture 
helps to determine how resources are allocated within an economy. 
 Our research is focused on how culture informs financialization. To summarize, Kripper 
(2005) and Epstein (2005), recognizes financialization as a state in which financial depth, 
motives, and activities become too excessive for the economy and society.  One of the most 
significant consequences of this is income inequality. 
 Recent studies by Kus (2012) and Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) show that 
financialization is a strong and significant determinant of income inequality in advanced 
economies. Furthermore, Sawyer (2013) outlines that income inequality is a prevalent feature 
of the financialized society. These findings and conceptualization gives financialization a 
negative connotation. 
The United Nations Development Programme launched the Human Development Index 
in 1990, developed by prominent development economists Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen. 
Considering that improved income equality is a hallmark of human development, we were 
compelled to investigate the determinants of financialization. It is our hope that this research 
may provide some insights that may be useful in policy to help alleviate the negative impacts 
of financialization. 
 The literature on financialization has largely been focused on how it impacts socio-
economic events. However, there is a dearth of literature on how social events or elements 
determine financialization. This further motivates our interest in looking at how national 
culture impacts financialization. We contend that this dearth comes from the difficulty of 
delineating the difference between financial development and financialization.  Especially 
since international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank have been committed to 
global financial development since McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) established the 
relationship between financial development and economic development. Evidenced by these 
organizations’ commitment to financial development, the general perception has been that 
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financial deepening is good for any economy. However, we will discuss authors who find that 
financial deepening eventually reduces economic output. 
Considering our aim to illustrate how society influences financialization we propose 
the following research question: Is national culture a determinant of financialization? If so, 
what are the elements of national culture which are determinants? 
To accomplish this aim we clearly define what is meant by financial development and 
financialization.  In our study we assume that the finding that domestic credit to private sector 
(% of GDP) has a detrimental impact on economic output by Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) 
and Arcand et al. (2015) is the differentiating factor. This is supported by the fact that excessive 
extension of credit is a prominent feature of financialization, (Sawyer, 2013).   
To measure national culture, we used four of Hofstede's (1980) cultural dimensions 
within our models.  Furthermore, to ensure robustness we utilized primary religion as an 
alternative proxy of national culture as prescribed by Stulz and Williamson (2003). 
We developed a cross - section of data that was estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) with heteroskedastic robust standard errors. The sample was divided into two.   In order 
to get as many cultural dimensions as possible we limited our sample to 55 countries. One 
sample included all countries, while the other only countries with a domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) above 80%.  Within the 55 countries we find that 30 countries reached or 
exceeded the threshold of 80%. 
 Our results indicated that none of Hofstede's cultural dimensions are significant 
determinants of financialization.  However, power distance has a significant negative 
relationship with financial development.  In addition, we found that there is a strong negative 
relationship between Islam and both financial development and financialization. 
 This dissertation contributes to the literature in multiple ways. Firstly, it is one of the 
first study to use so many of Hofstede's cultural dimensions to examine financial development. 
Secondly, it is the first known study to link national culture to financialization. Thirdly, it is the 
first known study to develop a proxy that illustrates the continuum between financial 
development and financialization. Fourthly, it is one of the first studies to empirically establish 
determinants of financialization.  Finally, it is the first known study to highlight a possible 
relationship between Islam and financialization. 
The paper begins with a literature review that thoroughly introduces the concept of 
financial development with its determinants, definitions and features of financialization, a 
review of Hofstede´s cultural dimensions, and a presentation of similar empirical studies with 
their respective methodologies. In the chapter, Data and Methodology, we outline the 
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dependent and independent variables, descriptive statistics, model specification, and the 
empirical strategy. Thereafter, we present the results of the study. Finally, we conclude the 
dissertation with a discussion of our findings, research challenges, and the opportunities this 
paper gives for future research.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
In this chapter we aim to establish the theoretical foundations governing this 
dissertation. Considering the tile of this dissertation, this review explores the concepts of 
financialization and culture.  We commence this section by exploring a concept that is not 
expressed in the title, financial development. For reasons which we will explain later in this 
chapter, we conclude that financial development depth is the theoretical genesis of 
financialization. This shall be explained by the burgeoning literature which finds that excessive 
credit to the private sector (80-120% of GDP) reduces output growth (Arcand et al., 2015). 
This lends from the previous findings of Rousseau and Wachtel (2011). The theoretical 
discussion concludes with a thorough examination of the theory of culture and Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions. This section is also supported by a review of similar studies which 
investigates the relationship between financial development and culture, and their 
methodological considerations. 
2.1 Financial Development 
 Financial development has been a dominant concern of the IMF, World Bank, and 
World Economic Forum. The IMF (International Monetary Fund) and World Bank are the 
world’s leading international organisations with the aim of global economic development. In 
their IMF working paper, Khan and Senhadji (2000) define financial development as the 
measure of financial depth of a country’s financial markets. Beck et al. (2000) introduces a 
new database hosted by the World Bank. In the database are indicators of financial structure 
and financial development across countries and time. These indicators measure the size, 
activity, and efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets. Beck et al. (2010) in response 
to the financial crisis introduces financial system stability as a critical indicator. The World 
Economic Forum’s Financial Development Report (2012) defines financial development as the 
policies, factors, and the institutions that lead to the efficient intermediation and effective 
financial markets. The perceived importance of financial development has not been 
underscored by these organisations which bear the duty of bringing development to many 
vulnerable nations.  We argue that a series of monumental papers in the 20th century helped to 
provide confidence in the notion that financial development results in economic growth and 
development. 
 The earliest known research which promotes the notion of developed financial systems 
can be traced back to Bagehot (1873). In this work Bagehot argues that large and well organized 
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capital markets in England enhanced resource allocation to the aid of productive investment. 
However, we may propose that Schumpeter (1911), which provides more elaborate insights in 
financial development, helped to instigate the financial development debate of the 20th century. 
Joseph Schumpeter (1911) argues that the services provided by financial intermediaries are 
essential for the technological innovation and economic development. These services include: 
the mobilizing savings, evaluating projects, managing risk, monitoring managers, and 
facilitating transactions.  In this same vein, Hicks (1969) finds that financial markets are 
important in the process of industrial revolution given that the development of financial 
systems contribute to the applications of new technologies and innovations. 
 With reference to the role of financial development and economic growth, Goldsmith 
(1969) argues that there is evidence to suggest a positive link between financial development 
and economic growth.  Goldsmith (1969); McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) hypothesize that 
financial liberalization and stock market development promotes economic growth through its 
impact on the growth rate of savings, investment, and thus economic growth. This is also called 
McKinnon-Shaw model. In more recent research, Levine (1997, 2005) suggests that the 
transaction cost of accessing external funds has shrunk considerably since the 1970s. A 
reduction which the author suggests assist in the facilitation of investment and market entry, 
provocation of competitive pressures to innovate, and mobilisation of savings to accumulate 
capital, all of which furthers economic growth. 
 King and Levine (1993) were the first researchers to establish that financial depth is a 
predictor of economic growth. Levine and Zervos (1998) illustrated that stock market liquidity, 
not the size of the stock market, is a predictor of economic growth. 
 The emphasis on the relevance and economic development capacity of financial 
developed has been explored to a broad extent in the literature. However, what have been 
attracting the attention of many researches in recent years are the determinants of financial 
development. 
2.1.1. Legal Origins 
 La Porta et al. (1998) argues that the origin of a particular nation’s legal code influences 
the treatment of creditors and shareholders, and the efficiency of contract enforcement. La 
Porta et al. (1998) establishes the law and finance theory. In this work it is found that legal 
systems differ systematically in proliferating property rights.  La Porta et al. (1998) suggest the 
most modern legal systems are derived from British common law, French civil law, German 
civil law, or Scandinavian civil law. These legal systems were spread principally by colonial 
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conquest, and post French revolution Napoleonic conquests. According to La Porta et al. (1998) 
and Beck et al. (2003) the relatively limited capital markets in French civil law countries lends 
to poor investor protection. In contrast, British common law tends to protect the rights of 
private property owners. Relative to other legal systems it was found by La Porta et al. (1998) 
that British common law is most conducive to financial development whereas French civil law 
the least. 
Djankov et al. (2002, 2003), builds on the work of La Porta et al. (1998) and by legal 
scholars such as Dawson (1960) and Merryman (1985). Djankov et al. (2002, 2003) show that 
the “legal origin” of a country has a significant and important effect on the degree of legal 
formalism. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) find that increased legal formalism reduces financial 
development. The authors also find that legal formalism is much stronger in countries with a 
French civil law origin, and the least in countries with a British common law legal origin. 
2.1.2. Institutions 
 The legacy of colonialism on financial markets is investigated in Beck et al. (2003). 
The researchers found that both the origin of legal institutions and institutions which protects 
from predatory governance continue to determine the size of capital markets. Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) further these findings by establishing that constraining government power 
seems to matter more when explaining financial development. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) 
propose that the difference in financial development is due to the colonial strategies of 
European empires. The paper argues that this is dictated by the disease environment 
encountered by European settlers. In places which had relatively minimal health hazards for 
settlement colonial powers devised institutions similar to their home countries. A major 
example of this is creating a political system which prevents the government from having 
excessive levels of power. Conversely, countries which were too inhospitable for settlement 
served for the extraction of resources. As such institutions served to maximize state income 
rather than to promote good governance. 
With relevance to financial transactions, North (1981) address the reliance of 
contracting institutions relying on the state to protect financial transactions, and the risk that 
the political elite will extract financial resources instead of protecting them. The authors 
classify this as contracting and predatory dimensions of institutional quality. 
2.1.3. Policy 
 De La Torre et al. (2007) examine the requirement of policy thinking for financial 
development. According to the authors, in order to achieve strong and deep financial systems 
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the following are necessary: strong stock markets, financing of small and medium enterprises, 
and defined contribution of pension system. In addition, governments bear the responsibility 
of providing the best mechanisms for the provision of efficient mobilization of resources, and 
risk allocation. This responsibility calls for the implementation of sound prudential regulation 
including appropriate accounting without increasing moral hazard. Government is also 
required to aid the provision of a sound institutional and informational environment. De La 
Torre et al. (2007) recommends that in order to attain high levels of financial development 
governments must facilitate flexible and shock proof exchange rates, a strong local currency, 
and a strong regulatory environment which encourages the enforcement of contracts. 
 The roles of macroeconomic policies such as maintaining lower inflation and attracting 
higher invest are well documented promoters of financial development. Huybens and Smith 
(1999) theoretically investigate the effects of inflation on financial development. It was found 
that economies with higher inflation rates are likely to have smaller, less active and less 
efficient banks and equity markets. 
2.1.4. Trade Openness 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) as well as Haung and Temple (2005) concludes that there is 
a positive relationship between trade openness and financial development. Do and Levchenko 
(2004) also finds that openness to external trade tend to boost financial development. The 
aforementioned paper argues that in countries endowed with physical capital, specialisation in 
capital-intensive industries increases the demand for functional financial intermediation. 
2.1.5. Geography 
There is a significant body of research highlights the importance of geography on 
general economic development. While our concern is on financial development, we are of the 
view that this review would be more thorough by exploring this research. 
Kamarck (1976), Diamond (1997), Gallup et al. (1999) and Sachs (2003) all suggest 
that tropical location negatively impacts economic development. Fragile tropical soils, unstable 
water supply, and prevalence of crop pests lead to poor crop yields and production, hence a 
more grim economic development reality. Acemoglu et al. (2001) also supports this with the 
claim that tropical location promotes an inhospitable disease-prone environment. Essentially it 
is believed that this is a primary cause of extractive intuitions. 
There is also some research which highlights the negative impact of being landlocked, 
distant from large markets or having only limited access to coasts and rivers navigable to the 
ocean. Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997); Malik and Temple (2009) claim that distance from large 
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markets or having only limited access to coasts navigable to the ocean antagonize economic 
development. 
2.1.6. Other Variables 
There are a number of other variables which have been explored at varying degrees to 
explain financial development. These factors include economic and cultural influences. 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Saint – Paul (1992) present that as an economy 
grows, the cost of financial intermediation decrease as a result of intensive competition 
including a larger amount of funds available for productive investment. Levine (1997, 2003, 
2005) also document the importance of income levels for financial development. 
Stulz and Williamson (2003) suggest that culture has some impact in the process of 
financial development. They find that Catholic countries have significantly weaker creditor 
rights than other countries. In a study of 49 countries, the authors show that a country’s 
principal religion better predicts the cross-sectional variation in creditor’s rights than a 
country’s natural openness to international trade, its language, its income per capita, or origin 
of its legal system.  
2. 1.7.  Criticisms of Financial Development 
There are many influential economists believe that financial development it is relatively 
unimportant. Robinson (1952) defends that financial development simply follows economic 
growth. Lucas (1988) asserts that the relationship between financial and economic 
development "over-stressed. Burkett (1987) contends that stock market development may not 
lead to increased output growth rates. Espinosa and Hunter (1994) insist that an entirely 
liberalized financial sector may be undesirable in a developing economy because stock market 
fluctuations would incite greater increases in financial suppression rather than economic 
growth. 
Development economists frequently express their scepticism of the role of the financial 
system. According to Anand Chandavarkar (1992) this is usually done by ignoring it. In a 
collection of essays by the “pioneers of development economics,” there is no mention of 
finance, (Morawetz, 1985). 
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2.2 Financialization   
Stockhammer (2004), Dumenil and Levy (2004a, 2004b), Crotty (2005), and Epstein 
and Jayadev (2005) refer to financialization as the rise of financial investment and incomes 
from the globalisation of financial markets. Earlier literature considers the growing importance 
of ‘shareholder value’ in economic decisions (Froud et al., 2000). 
While the aforementioned conceptualisations are relatively systematic the following 
aims to link financialization to the level to individual economic agents. Epstein (2005: 3) 
explains, “Here we will cast the net widely and define financialization quite broadly: for us, 
financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial 
actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies”. 
Kripper (2005: 48) defines financialization from the perspective of the firm, “financialization 
as a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather 
than through trade and commodity production.” 
Sawyer (2013) highlights the work of FESSUD (2011). The Financialisation, Economy, 
Society and Sustainable Development (FESSUD) project is a multidisciplinary project which 
aims to forge alliances across the social sciences in order to understand how finance can better 
serve economic, social, and environmental needs. The project runs from 01/12/2011 to 
30/11/2015 and has institutional partners from 14 leading universities in Europe and South 
Africa as well as one European non-government organisation. Sawyer (2014), following Fine 
(2011), and the FESSUD description of work identifies eight features of financialization in the 
present period (since circa 1980). 
The first feature refers to the relationship between financialization and the depth or size 
of financial markets. “First, it refers to the large – scale expansion and proliferation of financial 
markets over the past thirty years,” (Sawyer, 2013:7). Palma and Blankenburg (2009) explains 
that the ratio of financial assets to global GDP has risen threefold from 1.5 to 4.5 in the last 
thirty years. 
Deregulation also seems to have a profound contribution to the expansion of the 
financial system. “Second, the process of financialization is closely interwoven with the 
deregulation of the financial system itself and the economy generally,” (Sawyer, 2013:8). 
Davidson (2008) finds that investment in future commodities more generally had increased by twenty 
times since 2003. 
Within this sectorial growth we can also consider the activity of financial market 
players. “Third, financialization has is understood as the expansion and the proliferation of 
financial instruments and services. This is associated with the birth of a range of financial 
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institutions and markets, corresponding acronyms that are bewilderingly complex, quite apart 
from futures markets for trading in commodities yet to be produces (for which futures carbon 
trading is the most striking and, infamously, subprime mortgages;” (Sawyer, 2013:8). 
The literature also shows that financialization penetrates the private sector. “Fourth, 
financialization at a systemic level has been located in terms of the dominance of finance over 
industry” (Sawyer, 2013:8). 
Furthermore, financialization has clear socio-economic implications. “Fifth, 
financialization is strongly associated with market mechanisms, complemented or reinforced 
by policies that have underpinned rising inequality of income and of inequality more 
generally,” (Sawyer, 2013:8). 
One may argue that the extension of credit helps to sustain financialization. “Sixth, 
consumption has often been sustained by the extension of credit, not least through the use of 
capital gains as collateral,” (Sawyer, 2013:8). 
Based on the literature, one cannot isolate or limit the impact of financialization in 
socio-economic life. It is pervasive. “Seventh, it is not merely the expansion and proliferation 
of financial instruments and markets that are striking but also the penetration of such financing 
into a widening range of both economic and social reproduction – housing, pensions, health, 
and so on…”(Sawyer, 2013:8). 
2.2.1. The Relationship between Financial Development and Financialization 
In our study we assume with some comfort that financialization is essentially an 
advanced state of financial development. We propose that financialization is the state in which 
both the social and economic growth benefits of financial development erode and vanish.  
Given the negative connotation of the term financialization, we consider that an examination 
of this relationship is a criticism of financial development. In this part of the literature review 
we bear the burden of establishing the theoretical connection between financial development 
and financialization. We pursue this linkage by examining the literature which explicitly claims 
and proves that financial development depth is detrimental to economic output. In this 
discussion we consider one aspect of financialization, financial market and institutional depth. 
We shall conclude this section by claiming, based on existing literature, that domestic credit to 
private sector (% GDP) is a proxy of a defining aspect of financialization. 
The works of the following researchers help to establish that excessive financial depth 
increases economic volatility and decreases output. Minsky (1974) and Kindleberger (1978) 
argue that there is a distinct relationship between finance and macroeconomic volatility. Rajan 
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(2005) discusses the relationship the eminent dangers of financial development suggesting that 
a large and complicated financial system increases the probability of a “catastrophic 
meltdown”. This paper seems rather prophetic as it predates the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
More recently, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012), show that the level of financial development 
is good only to a point, after which it become a drag on growth. Using the same measure as 
Arcand et al. (2015), they find the level to be above 90 percent of GDP. This finding is from a 
sample of developed and advanced economies. The sample focusing on advanced economics 
illustrates that a fast-growing financial sector is detrimental to aggregate productivity growth. 
Furthermore, the period of study is quite expansive, 1960-2010. This period transcends pre-
1980s liberalization and deregulation as well as the 2007- 8 financial crisis.  
There are similar studies which uphold the claim that domestic credit to private sector 
has a strong causal role in reducing economic output. Using a panel of 87 countries, Law and 
Singh (2014) estimate that this measure is detrimental to economic output above 94%. 
However, Beck et al. (2014) using a sample of 100 economies found that the threshold is much 
higher, 109%. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is some responsibility of domestic credit 
extension and economic misfortune. 
The previous authors give us the intuition that excessive financial depth leads has 
negative economic consequences, but we must now explore the proxy which promotes this. 
Considering the aforementioned arguments, we recall the elements of financialization outlined 
by FESSUD (2011). Notably, that financialization is both the expansion of financial 
instruments and services. With respect to the use of complicated financial products and 
instruments as an element of financialization we review the following findings. Coval et al. 
(2009) outlines the role of complex structured products in the US financial crisis. Gennaioli et 
al. (2010) develop a theory in which the presence of some neglected tail risk when coupled 
with financial innovation can augment financial fragility, even in the absence of leverage. 
Although the previous possible linkage between excessive financial development and 
financialization is profound, we find the following most poignant and relevant, “consumption 
has often been sustained by the extension of credit.” If we are to conclude that financialization 
is a phenomenon that has a negative impact on socio-economic conditions, we must consider 
its modus operandi. We propose that the proliferation and dependence of credit may be what is 
responsible for the transition from financial development to financialization.  Easterly et al. 
(2000) empirically explain that there is a convex and monotonic relationship between financial 
depth and volatility of output growth. According to the authors the point in which output 
volatility starts increasing is when credit to private sector reaches 100% of GDP. This is 
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congruent to the recent and widely publicized work of Arcand et al. (2015) which find that the 
threshold above which finance starts having a negative impact on output growth is when credit 
to private sector is between 80-120% of GDP. 
From a social perspective, much of the popularity of the concept of financialization is 
grounded in the hypothesis that is proliferates income inequality. The literature which links 
financialization and income inequality is excessive. Authors include: Epstein (2005), Palley 
(2007), Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin (2011), Kus (2012). The dominance of income inequality 
in a financialized economy is also an element of FESSUD (2011), “financialization is a strongly 
associated with the market mechanisms, complemented or even reinforced by policies that have 
underpinned rising inequality of incomes and of inequality more generally.”  This discussion 
on inequality further compounds our questioning of the role of credit market in financial 
development and financialization. Galor and Zeira (1993) and Galor and Moav (2004) explains 
that in the presence of high levels of inequality, credit market imperfections can have a negative 
effect on growth. This perpetuates inequality because it prevents the poor from accumulating 
human capital, which unlike physical capital, must spread throughout the population. There is 
a contradiction because the deepening and widening of credit markets should allow all income 
groups to access credit. But the growth in income inequality suggests otherwise. The literature 
on the relationship between credit markets and inequality is rather limited and require future 
research. In accordance to our questioning of the credit market in this section, it may be useful 
to investigate the role of the credit market in the financialization-income inequality nexus. 
Nevertheless, it furthers our curiosity with respect to how the extension of credit promotes 
financialization.  
2.3 Culture and Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions 
 Alder (1997) argues that culture influences our values, which then influences our 
attitudes and then behaviour. This is why culture is so important in the examination of the 
decisions of individuals and groups.  This pattern of influence has been empirically 
demonstrated by Homer and Kahle (1998). 
Culture is described by Hall (1959:2) “as a mould in which we are cast, and it controls 
our life in many unsuspected ways…the part of man’s behaviour which he takes for granted – 
the par he doesn’t think about, since he assumes it is universal or regards it as idiosyncratic. 
This definition holds that culture is an invisible factor for which one has no control. 
However, Schein (1998) asserts that culture is the way in which a group of people solves 
problems and reconciles dilemmas. 
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Morgan (1997:141) also speaks to the dynamic nature of culture, “an active, living 
phenomenon through which people create and recreate worlds.”  The author continues to 
explain this rather active definition of culture with, “culture is the outcome of the shared 
experiences arising from an organization’s attempts to resolve fundamental problems of 
adapting to the external world.” 
Geert Hofstede (1997) defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind 
which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another.” 
Hofstede (2001) presents five dimensions which are used to explain cross-cultural 
differences which exist throughout the world. They are as follows: 
 
a. Individualism vs. Collectivism – This refers to the relationship between the individual and 
others. In an individualistic society believes and behaviour are determined by the individual. 
However, in a collective society, loyalty toward one’s country, family, and job dictates one’s 
actions and decision making. Essentially, the term “we” as opposed to “I” is a source of identity 
and the individual is dependent upon the group. 
b. Power Distance – Denotes the inequality that exists between people within a given society. 
This governs how power is distributed and the effect of wealth on the social distance between 
individuals. Essentially it speaks to how much unequal distribution of power is accepted, (Shaiq 
et al., 2011). 
c. Uncertainty Avoidance – Highlights the extent to which individuals within a particular culture 
feel threatened by uncertain events or the unknown. This speaks to the degree in which a society 
creates rules and values absolute truth. Furthermore, in the presence of high uncertainty 
avoidance there is an aversion towards going against nature in order to avoid risks, sudden 
changes, and unclear possibilities. 
d. Masculinity vs. Femininity – In a more masculine culture there is a higher emphasis on the 
opportunity for high income, recognition for a job well done, challenges at work, and 
promotion. Whereas in feminine culture good relationships, job security, and a desirable living 
environment is important. 
e. Long Term vs. Short Term Orientation – A long-term oriented culture strives towards think and 
perseverance. On the contrary short-term oriented cultures involves respecting traditions and 
social obligations. 
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2.3.1 Other Cultural Models 
In the following tables we outline other important cultural models. Like Hofestede 
(1980) these authors present cultural models that are based on dimensions. Hall’s model (1990) 
frames culture into three dimensions: communication context, timing of tasks, and 
interpersonal space. This is presented below as Table 1. Trompenaar (1998) provides seven 
cultural dimensions which can be used to assess national culture. These dimensions are 
presented below as Table 2.  
Table 1: Hall’s Model  
Dimension Concept 
Context High-Context: 
primary meaning conveyed nonverbally, 
contextually, and situationally 
Low-Context: 
primary meaning conveyed verbally or through 
writing 
 
Time Monochronic: 
promptness, preciseness, and sequential 
Polychronic: 
multi-tasks, unpreciseness, and synchronous 
 
Space Proxemics: 
the appropriate interpersonal length of distance or 
space 
Table 2: Trompenaar’s Seven Dimensions of Culture  
Dimension Concept 
Universalism vs. Particularism whether a culture is based on rules and standards or 
relationship and trust. 
 
Individualism vs. Collectivism whether a culture focuses more on the group or 
Individual. 
 
Neutral vs. Affective whether the person within a culture expresses 
one’s emotion openly or not. 
 
Specific vs. Diffuse whether the public and private life are closely 
linked or not 
 
Achievement vs. Ascription whether a culture rewards according to one’s 
performance or to one’s age, status, or gender 
 
Time (Sequential vs. Synchronous) whether people tend to do one thing at a time 
or several things at once 
 
Environment (Internal vs. External Control) whether people can control or should harmonize 
with nature 
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2.3.2 Criticism of Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions 
Researchers criticise Hofstede’s survey because they find that a survey is not a valid 
instrument to determine cultural differences. Schwartz (1999) argues that in some cases the 
variables are more sensitive for one culture more than another. 
Dorfmaan and Howell (1988) suggest that Hofstede assess the individual and apply 
those findings to the overall community. These individual assessments promote the idea of a 
cultural homogeneity. 
Sondergaard (1994) and Newman (1996) speak of the fact that at the time of the survey 
Europe was recently disturbed by World War II. As such, Masculinity and Uncertainty 
Avoidance may have been sensitive during the time of the survey. 
 One may argue that culture is fragmented across groups and nation boundaries. 
According to McSweeney (2000), nations are not a valid unit of analysis. This is because 
culture is not necessarily bounded by borders. 
Graves (1986), Olie (1995) both question the one company approach. Note that 
Hofstede’s research is based on data from one company. The authors criticize that the findings 
doing provide valid information on the culture of the entire country. 
McSweeney (2002) mentioned that Hofstede’s dimensions continue to be widely used 
because of its clarity, simplicity and applicability. Lynn and Gelb (1996), promotes the ability 
of Hofstede to capture cross-country differences, as a major benefit of the model. 
The following support for Hofstede comes from authors who conducted a similar study 
to this dissertation. We find their opinion relatively valuable given the nature of our work. 
Kwok and Tadesse (2006) defended Hofstede in their study on the relationship between 
national culture and financial structure. They noted that Hofstede’s dimensions provide a 
commonly acceptable, well-defined, and empirically based terminology to characterize 
cultures. Secondly, the dimensions because they are systematically collected data from a wide 
number of culture and countries.  
2. 4 Similar Empirical Studies and their Methodological Aspects 
In this section we review some other studies which have attempted to link culture to 
financial development.  This is among the first empirical studies linking national culture to 
financialization. As such, we do not have any similar studies directed to financialization. 
Nevertheless, if we are to assume that financialization is an advanced state of financial 
development, we review studies in the latter. Recall Arcand et al. (2015) and Rousseau and 
Wachtel (2011), who showed that financial deepening reduces output growth.  In previous 
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sections, we reviewed a number of the determinants of financial development proposed by 
researchers. They include policy, institutional, trade, and geographic determinants. However, 
in this section we place specific emphasis on that which is more salient to our research, culture 
as a determinant of financial development. 
 First we consider the oft-cited work of Stulz and Williamson (2003). The authors show 
that a country’s primary or predominant religion predicts the cross-sectional variation in 
creditor’s rights better than the country’s natural openness to international trade, its language, 
its income per capita, and origin of its legal system.  The authors use shareholder rights, creditor 
rights, and rule of law as proxies of financial development. They find that Catholic countries 
protect the rights of creditors less so than Protestant countries. This result remains even when 
they controlled for legal system and GNP per capita. Recall La Porta et al. (1998) which 
establishes that French civil law based countries tend to have weaker levels of financial 
development.  
 Herger et al. (2008) citing this work, notes that catholic believers seem to induce 
weaker protection of creditor’s rights and increase the legal formalities to enforce contracts. 
According to the authors, this may be the result of the close association between the church 
and the state in some Catholic countries, where bureaucracies find their origin in religious ranks 
adopting the church’s hierarchical studies.  Within this same thought, Beck et al. (2003) 
suggests that Catholicism may have impacted the legal systems in French civil law societies, 
given that this faith is predominant in these countries. 
In his investigation into the determinants of financial development Huang (2005). The 
paper studies the determinants of cross-country differences in financial development.  Their 
analysis suggests that the level of financial development in a country is determined by its 
institutional quality, income, macroeconomic policies, and geographic characteristics. And 
more relevant to our studies, also, cultural characteristics.  Like Stulz and Williams (2003), 
religion is used the indicator for national culture.   
Herger et al.  (2008) investigates the difference in the size of capital markets across 
countries. They consider stock market capitalisation and credit to private sector as proxies for 
financial development, albeit with an emphasis on size. They use a number of variables to 
capture institutional quality, trade, culture, geography, and colonial history. All possible 
determinants of financial developments. They find that trade openness and institutions 
constraining the political elite from expropriating financiers show a strong effect on the size of 
a country’s capital markets. However, cultural beliefs were found not to pose significant 
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obstacles for financial development. Like Stulz and Williamson (2003) they use religion as a 
proxy for national culture. 
Dutta and Mukherjee (2012) in their investigation of whether culture is a determinant 
of financial development veers from the usage of religion as a proxy of national culture. Instead 
they develop a culture index as proposed by Tabellini (2008). According to Tabellini (2008) 
this measure incorporates four societal components: trust, self-determination, respect and 
obedience. It is worthwhile to note that a number of earlier authors emphasise the role of trust 
in economic outcome. La Porta et al. (1997) and Knack (2001), all identify that greater levels 
of trust are associated with higher levels of growth and development. Dutta and Mukherjee 
(2012) provided five proxies of financial development: liquid liabilities, private credit by 
deposit money banks, private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions, 
stock market capitalization, and stock market total value trades.  These variables correspond to 
the size of financial markets and institutions instead of activity and efficiency (Beck et al., 
2000). Using the quantile estimation technique in a cross section of 90 countries, they find that 
culture significantly influences the level of financial development. To ensure robustness, the 
authors use Hofstede’s cultural dimension, uncertainty avoidance, as an alternative proxy of 
culture. They find that uncertainty avoidance has a negative relationship with financial 
development. This is as expected because according to the authors an uncertainty avoidant 
society is less apt to change and risk. 
So far we have outlined the results and contributions of papers examining culture as a 
determinant of financial development. However, the following paper investigated how culture 
informs the structure of the financial system of a country.  Essentially, Kwok and Tadesse 
(2006) sought to reveal how culture impacts the architecture of the financial system, not just 
the level of its development. This speaks to how culture impacts the space in which financial 
activities are organized. The basis of this research comes from the fact that the US and UK 
financial systems are dominated by stock markets, whereas in continental Europe and Japan 
banks play a significant role in orchestrating financial activities.  They presented architecture 
with respect to size, activity, and efficiency. Within each of the three groups presented a number 
of financial development variables are used as provided by Beck et al. (2000).  Using 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (2001), they found that there is a preference for banking-based 
systems in countries with higher uncertainty avoidance. 
Like Kwok and Tadesse (2006), Mukherjee and Dutta (2013) contributes to the 
literature by presenting the impact of culture on the development of national financial 
infrastructure. However, what makes this paper particularly novel is that it found that culture 
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and institutions jointly promote financial development. They used the ratio of private credit by 
deposit money bank to GDP as the proxy for financial development.  This is a widely used 
measure as presented by Beck et al. (2000), Beck et al. (1999) and Levine and Zervos (1998). 
This measure captures the channelling of savings to investors through financial intermediaries. 
Following Tabellini (2008), they used an aggregate of trust, respect, control, and obedience.  
The authors also used a number of proxies for political institution, including a measure of the 
quality of democracy, polity II.  Polity II is an index of the quality of democratic institutions. 
Mukherjee and Dutta (2012) found that political institutions and culture jointly promotes 
financial development. Having efficient political institutions supports the effectiveness of the 
measure of culture and thus financial development is enhanced. 
Table four below outlines the methodological aspects of the major similar empirical 
studies presented above.  As our own, all of the similar studies can be classified as cross-
national research studies. 
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Table 3: Methodological Considerations of Similar Studies 
This table serves as a summary of the methodological considerations of the studies most similar to this dissertation. 
We include the sample size, proxies used to measure the financial development of each country, the indicator (s) 
of national culture considered, the empirical method, and a justification for why the respective method was 
selected. The table concludes by presenting whether or not the papers find evidence of culture having a significant 
impact on the chosen financial development proxies. 
 
Authors Countries Proxies for 
Financial 
Development (FD) 
Measure of 
Culture 
Empirical 
Method 
Justification 
for Chosen 
Method 
Evidence of 
the 
Significance 
of Culture 
Stulz and 
Williamson 
(2003) 
49 Shareholder’s 
Rights; Creditor’s 
Rights; Rule of Law 
Primary 
religion 
Multiple 
regressions 
estimation 
Permits the 
usage of many 
cultural 
variables 
 
Yes 
Huang (2005) 64 Liquid liabilities; 
Bank overhead costs; 
Net interest margins, 
Stock market 
capitalization; Total 
values traded; 
Turnover ratio 
 
Primary 
religion, Stulz 
and 
Williamson 
(2003); 
European 
Language, 
Hall and 
Jones (1999) 
 
Bayesian 
model 
averaging; 
General-to-
specific 
approaches 
To address 
model 
uncertainty 
and to include 
a vast amount 
of variables 
Yes 
Kwok and 
Tadesse (2006) 
41 Multiple variables 
related to the size, 
efficiency, and 
activity of financial 
markets and 
institutions 
 
Uncertainty 
avoidance, 
Hofstede 
(1983, 2001) 
Logit 
regression 
estimation 
To measure 
the increase in 
the log of the 
odds ratio 
Yes 
Herger et al. 
(2008) 
128 Credit to private 
sector as % of GDP; 
Stock Market 
Capitalization 
Primary 
religion, 
Stulz and 
Williamson 
(2003) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares; 
Two-stage 
ordinary 
least squares 
using 
instrumental 
variables 
 
To account for 
endogeneity 
among 
variables 
Yes 
Dutta and 
Mukherjee 
(2012) 
90 Liquid liabilities; 
Private credit by 
deposit money 
banks; Private credit 
by deposit money 
banks and other 
financial institutions; 
stock market 
capitalization; stock 
market total value 
traded 
Aggregate 
index of 
culture 
comprised of 
trust, respect, 
control, and 
obedience, 
Tabellini 
(2008); 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance, 
Hofstede 
(2001) 
 
Quantile 
regression 
estimation 
To minimize 
the impact of 
outliers 
Yes 
Dutta and 
Mukherjee 
(2013) 
69 Ratio of private 
credit by deposit 
money bank to GDP 
Aggregate 
index of 
culture 
comprised of 
trust, respect, 
control, and 
obedience, 
Tabellini 
(2009) 
Fixed effects 
specification
; GMM 
estimators 
To account for 
endogeneity in 
panel data 
Yes, jointly 
with 
institutional 
quality 
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3. Data and Methodology   
 
By the end of this section, one will understand the reasoning and information used to 
develop our empirical models.  We open this section by outlining our data considerations. This 
is inclusive of the variables chosen and their respective sources.  From there we explain our 
methodology and the empirical model specification.  After this chapter, we present the results 
of the dissertation, which are based on the empirical strategy outlined in this chapter. 
3.1 Data 
Within this section we present the possible determinants of financial development and 
financialization. Thereafter we introduce the cultural variables we intend to use. As well as the 
alternative measures of national culture that we use to test robustness. Finally, we discuss how 
the sample size was chosen. We acknowledge that the aim was to have the widest amount of 
countries as possible based on the decision to use Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as our 
indicators of national culture. 
3.1.1. Determinants of Financial Development and Financialization Data 
 In continuation of our governing assumption that financialization is a developed stage 
of financial development; we are apt to propose that the determinants of the latter inform the 
development of the former. After a review of the literature, we found the following variables 
to be important determinants of the extension and proliferation of credit in the private sector. 
We have chosen variables that accounts for legislative environment, political conditions, 
macroeconomic environment, and openness to trade. Table 4 presents all of the variables 
included in our final models with their expected impacts on financial development and 
financialization. The results of these are found in table 16 of the appendix. Methodological 
considerations of these results are the same as those presented in Chapter 3.2.  
 
a) Legislative Environment - Legal Formalism Index 
Djankov et al. (2003) developed this index as a measure of the formality in legal 
procedures for collecting a bounced cheque. The index is from 1 (least cumbersome 
procedures) to 7(most cumbersome procedures). This index can be used to measure the quality 
of contracting institutions, according to Herger et al. (2008), which finds that there is a 
significant relationship between legal formalism and domestic credit to private sector (as % of 
GDP). 
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 Djankov et al. (2002, 2003), builds on the work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and by 
legal scholars such as Dawson (1960) and Merryman (1985). Djankov et al. (2002, 2003) show 
that the “legal origin” of a country has a significant and important effect on the degree of legal 
formalism. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) find that increased legal formalism reduces financial 
development.    
 As per the aforementioned literature, we expect that negative relationship between legal 
formalism and domestic credit to private sector (% of the GDP). The source of this index in 
this dissertation is Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). In this particular data set it measures the 
legal procedures in the year 2004. This is the most recent data available. 
 With reference to financialization, we expect a negative relationship. Legal formalism 
is associated with increased regulatory procedures, which work against the financial depth and 
development that is necessary to usher in the state of financialization. FESSUD (2011) and 
Sawyer (2013) presents that deregulation is a defining aspect of this occurrence.   
 
b) Quality of Democracy – Polity II 
 The importance of institutional quality dominates the literature review, and is 
repeatedly expressed in the literature on financial development. This has been defended by 
North (1981), Easterly and Levine (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), La Porta et al. (1999),  
Djankov et al. (2002), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Mukherjee and Dutta (2013), and many 
others. North (1981) addresses the reliance of contracting institutions relying on the state to 
protect financial transactions, and the risk that the political elite will extract financial resources 
instead of protecting them. The authors classify this as contracting and predatory dimensions 
of institutional quality. 
Polity II, from the Polity IV database, is an indicator of the quality of political 
institutions within a country. The value is derived by subtracting a score of autocracy from a 
democracy score. The democracy score ranges from -10 to +10.  The value incorporates factors 
such as the extent to which citizens can express preferences about political systems, and the 
extent of constraints on the powers of the national leader, also the extent to which the 
population enjoys civil liberties. 
 This popular indicator has a strong presence in financial development literature, 
Honohan (2004) as a determinant of financial development. This measure is also employed in 
the related literature, Dutta and Mukherjee (2012, 2013).  We shall use the denotation, POLITY, 
in our models to indicate this variable. 
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Following the literature, there is an expected positive relationship between POLITY and 
the dependent variable. North (1981) emphasizes that governing institutions that are predatory 
in nature discourages financial transactions. Considering that financialization is an advanced 
state of financial development, we expect that this relationship remains the same. 
 
c) Macroeconomic Stability - Standard Deviation of GDP per capita Growth Rate 
(annual percent) 
To account for the economic development differences in our sample we consider the 
standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate (annual percent). Hereon, shall be presented 
as SDGDPPC. This indicator is used in Huang (2005), Kwok and Tadesse (2006), and 
Mukherjee and Dutta (2013).  These authors found that there is a positive relationship between 
GDP per capita growth and financial development. This is an important variable as it has 
motivated decades of financial development policy. Especially after the work of McKinnon 
(1973) and after King and Levine (1993), which argues this causal relationship. The source of 
this variable is the World Bank Global Financial Development Database (2016). We use the 
standard deviation, as a means to measure the volatility of the macroeconomic environment, as 
opposed to just the growth so as to better understand the economic stability of a country. This 
variable treatment is suggested by Huang (2010). We understand that growth, does not always 
imply economic stability. Based on the literature, we expect that there is negative relationship 
between this variable and the dependent variable. The standard deviation was calculated using 
Microsoft Office Excel 2010.   
 
d) Trade Openness - Trade (as % of GDP) 
 Herger et al. (2008) finds that trade openness determines financial development. Before 
this, Rajan and Zingales (2003) establishes that there is positive relationship between trade 
openness and financial development. As an indicator of trade openness, we use trade as percent 
of GDP. This is sum of exports and imports of goods and services measures as share of gross 
domestic product.  Hereafter denoted as, TRADE. 
  Under the assumption that financialization is a heightened level of financial 
development, we anticipate that the same relationship should exist in our financialization 
sample.   
 e) Other Possible Variables  
 In deciding on a final model we considered many other variables that are related to the 
literature on financial development. Table 3 below, highlights alternative determinants, their 
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denotation, their significance in financial development, sources, studies, and reason for 
eliminating. The results of these variables are found in table 16 of the appendix.  
 
Table 4: Alternative Determinants of Financial Development and Financialization 
Variable Denotation Expected 
Impact 
Reason for 
Impact 
Studies Sources Reasons for 
Eliminating 
Common Law BRLAW Positive Creditors’ and 
shareholders’ 
rights 
La Porta 
et al. 
(1998) 
 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
 
Legal 
Formalism 
more 
appropriate 
and succinct 
 
French Civil 
Law 
FRLAW Negative Creditors’ and 
shareholders’ 
rights 
La Porta 
et al. 
(1998) 
 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Legal 
Formalism 
more 
appropriate 
and succinct 
 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization, 
Avg. 1965-1995 
ETHNIC Negative Institutional 
quality worse 
with 
fractionalization 
 
Alesina et 
al. (2003) 
Alesina et al. 
(2003) 
Indirect 
determinant, 
related to 
institutional 
quality 
 
Landlocked LAND Negative International 
Trade 
Sachs and 
Warner 
(1995, 
1999), 
Malik and 
Temple 
(2009) 
 
Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 
2005 
Indirect 
determinant, 
Related to 
trade 
openness 
 
Average GDP 
per Capita 
Growth Rate, 
Avg. 1980 - 2007 
AVGGDPPG Positive Economic 
Development 
Dutta and 
Mukherjee 
(2012) 
World Bank 
Global 
Financial 
Development 
Database 
Does not fully 
capture 
macro-
economic 
volatility  
 
Table 5: Expected Impact of the Determinants of Financial Development and Financialization 
Considering the reasoning presented in this section’s literature we constructed the following table. The table 
includes each respective determinant with possible impact, and the reasoning behind the assumption. For a 
thorough reference we include the studies which substantiate the expected impact. If we are to assume that 
financialization is an advanced state of financial development, we expect the relationships to be consistent. 
 
Determinant Expected Impact Reason Studies 
Legal Formalism 
Index 
Negative Legal difficulty of 
doing 
transactions/Qualit
y of contracting 
institutions 
 
Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005); 
Herger et al. 
(2008) 
Polity II Positive Quality of political 
institutions 
 
Dutta and 
Mukherjee (2012) 
Trade (as % of 
GDP) 
Positive 
 
Openness to trade Dutta and 
Mukherjee (2012) 
Standard 
Deviation of GDP 
per capita growth 
rate 
Negative Stability 
macroeconomic 
environment/output 
 
Huang (2005) 
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3.1.2. Cultural Data and Hypotheses 
 We have chosen to employ Hofstede (1983, 2001) cultural dimensions as our measure 
for national culture.  These dimensions offer a certain simplicity and comprehensibility that is 
valued in research, (McSweeney, 2002) and (Tadesse and Kwok, 2006). As mentioned above, 
we instead of the six dimensions available, we use only the four original dimensions, Hofstede 
(1980). The reasoning behind this is because we wanted to have our sample as broad as 
possible, and this decision permitted this. 
Hereafter, the four dimensions shall be labelled as follows: individualism (IDV), 
masculinity (MAS), power distance index (PDI), and uncertainty avoidance index (UAI).  Each 
dimensions is measured on a scale between 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest). This scale was 
constructed through a factorial analysis based on responders’ answers to survey. Note that what 
is important is not the value alone but the value relative to other countries. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Individualism is positively related to financial development and financialization 
because of overconfidence we expect individuals in an individualist society to be more willing 
to take financial risks. 
Individualism is linked with overconfidence which has a positive effect on financial 
risk taking according to Breuer et al. (2014). Gollier (2002) notes that individualism promotes 
a demand for risky assets. Risk taking is positively impacts financial development. However, 
given that financialization is characterized by the increase of risky and complex financial 
investments we hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between individualism and 
financialization. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Masculinity is positively related to financial development and financialization 
because of overconfidence we expect individuals in a masculine society to be more willing to 
take financial risks. 
 High Masculinity is associated with assertiveness, competitiveness, and valuing wealth 
according to Hofstede (2001). It is reasonable to assume that this leads to a certain level of 
confidence and willingness to take risk in order to attain wealth and to succeed in competition. 
Barber and Odean (2001) also proposes that masculinity is associated with high levels of 
overconfidence. As with individualism this increases willingness to engage in risky financial 
instruments and investments. 
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Hypothesis 3: Uncertainty Avoidance is negatively related to financial development and 
financialization because of a preference for regulation and heightened financial risk aversion 
among individuals in an uncertainty avoidant society. 
To date, uncertainty avoidance is the only one of Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions which 
have been examined in the context of financial development. Kwok and Tadesse (2006) and 
Dutta and Mukherjee (2012) find that there is a significant negative relationship between 
financial development and uncertainty avoidance. The questionnaire used to develop this index, 
Hofstede (2001), the following questions: 
(1) Stress: How often does one feel nervous or tense at work; 
(2) Employment stability: employees’ statement that they intend to continue with the company 
for more than five years; and 
(3) Rule orientation: agreement with the statement ‘Company rules should not be broken: even 
when the employee thinks it is in the company’s best interest.’ 
As discussed in the literature review, a high uncertainty avoidance ranking indicates 
that the country has a low tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. This enforces a rule oriented 
society that institutes rules, laws, and regulations to manage the amount of uncertainty. With 
this in mind, we expect that there is negative relationship between uncertainty avoidance and 
financial development. Furthermore, we expect that an emphasis on regulation and cultural fear 
of risk, reduces the advancement of financial development into financialization. We can also 
consider that this reduces participation of financial sector in the complex instruments 
associated with financialization.   
 
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between power distance and financial development is unknown. 
However, given that both power distance and financialization are positively related to income 
inequality we expect that they themselves are positively related. 
 To date there is not enough literature to suggest a relationship between power distance 
and financialization. The results of this dissertation should indicate the nature of this 
relationship. However, we expect that there is a relationship between power distance and 
financialization. By definition power distance is the individual’s expectation and acceptance of 
inequality in power or wealth within a society. The aforementioned statement is provided by 
Hofstede (2001) and Oysterman (2006).  The findings of Kus (2012) and Lin and Tomaskovic-
Devey (2013) strongly suggest that financialization is a determinant of inequality in advanced 
economies. In addition, Sawyer (2013) explain that income inequality is a defining 
characteristic of financialization. 
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3.1.3. Alternative Cultural Variables 
The primary religion of a country is often used in the literature as proxy of national 
culture, (Stulz and Williamson, 2003), (Huang, 2005), (Herger et al., 2008), and (Mukherjee 
and Dutta, 2012). Stulz and Williams (2003) suggest that monotheistic religions such as 
Catholic (CATH), Protestant (PROT), and Muslim (MUSL), each impact the establishment and 
enforcement of creditors’ rights at various degrees, which affects the efficiency of capital 
markets. This follows La Porta et al. (1998) which establishes the role that religion has on the 
protection of creditors’ rights. Within our empirical strategy, which shall be discussed in the 
coming section, we use these variables to test the robustness of ours study. We consider religion 
important because it informs both the institutions of country, and the values of individuals. 
Consider the demand for credit, there are varying attitudes towards the payment of interest 
based on religions, (Stulz and Williamson, 2003).  For example, Jews and Muslims have 
specific religious rules with respect to lending. We have decided not to use dummy variables 
but rather the proportion of members of these religions in each country. This is because also 
want to capture the attitudes that dictate the demand for credit, not only the institutional impact. 
Although a country may have a strong population of one faith which governs its institutions, 
the demand for financial resources is influenced by all members of the society, regardless of 
faith.  Herger et al. (2008) also considers the proportion of each of these religion in their study. 
In congruence with Stulz and Williamson (2003) and Herger et al. (2008), the data is the share 
of the population affiliated with each faith group in 2001, and the source is Encyclopaedia 
Britannica (2001). The measure is a proportion between 0 to 100 percent. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Catholicism is negatively related to financial development and financialization 
because of a relatively weaker protection of creditors’ rights in populations with a high 
Catholic population which is detrimental to credit market development.   
Following Stulz and Williamson (2003) we consider the role that a catholic population 
has financial development. There is evidence to suggest that having Catholic believers in a 
population reduces protection of creditor’s rights of enforcing contracts. Naturally, this is 
detrimental to the development of large credit markets. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Protestantism is positively related to financial development and financialization 
because of strong protection of creditors’ rights in populations with a high Protestant 
Population which is helpful for the development of credit markets. 
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 Stulz and Williamson (2003) suggests that creditors’ rights are better protected in 
protestant dominated countries. Contrary to Catholic populations, the evidence suggests that 
capital markets tend to me more developed in dominant protestant economies. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Islam is negatively related to financial development and financialization because 
states with high Muslim populations tend to have poor quality government which reduces 
investor confidence.   
 La Porta et al. (1999) finds that countries with large proportions of Muslims tend to 
suffer from low quality of government. We assume that investors may veer away from investing 
in a country where the quality of government is weak, and where financial transactions are 
insecure. One may recall that North (1981) which emphasizes the role of the state in inspiring 
confidence in investors. 
3.1.4. Sample Size and Descriptive Statistics  
Culture is an indisputably as sticky variable. Given its time invariant nature we chose 
to use cross-section data as opposed to time-series. This decision follows Herger et al. (2008) 
and Dutta and Mukherjee (2011). Like Dutta and Mukherjee (2011) we choose the benchmark 
year, 2008. This coincides with the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. Given that we have 
the aim of looking into financialization, this year is relevant. We recall that the global financial 
crisis instigated the debate and conceptualization of financialization, Sawyer (2013). 
The onset of financialization according to the theory is the deregulation and 
liberalization that commenced circa 1980, Sawyer (2013). As such our data is primarily 
concerned with variables, either sticky or time-variant, from the time period 1980-2008. The 
dependent variable is from the benchmark year. This is also done in Dutta and Mukherjee 
(2011). The time variant data such as TRADE and SDGDPPC is averaged done in accordance 
to Dutta and Mukherjee (2011). Like Herger et al. (2008) we consider legal formalism to be 
relatively sticky. This conclusion relates to the legal origins theory of La Porta et al. (2000). 
In our research we use the annual data for 58 countries spanning every continent besides 
Africa. As with similar studies, we focused on capturing as many countries as possible. We 
start with the Hofstede (2001) sample. The cultural variables data used is found on Hofstede's 
website. We eliminated a number of countries which do not have all the cultural variables that 
we intend to use.  We have chosen to use the first four cultural dimensions: Masculinity, 
Uncertainty Avoidance, Power Distance, and Individualism. These were the first dimensions 
developed, Hofstede (2000), and are the most widely used in literature. Furthermore, if we were 
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to use five or six dimensions our sample would be much smaller. We then eliminated a number 
of countries because of a lack of capital market data, or for the absence of capital markets. 
The sample shall be divided into two parts: Financial Development and 
Financialization. This follows our assumption that financialization is the advanced state of 
financial development. Going forward we label the first sample Financial Development sample 
and the second as the Financialization sample, with corresponding models of the same name. 
Our general sample includes the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and, Vietnam. This is a broad cross-section 
of countries of varied levels of economic development, financial development. It is also 
noteworthy that the sample is covers countries on every habitable continent except Africa, due 
to a lack of data. 
We use the findings of Arcand et al. (2015) as the criteria for deciding which countries 
are to be in the financialization sample. Recall, that between 80-120 % of GDP domestic credit 
to the private sector has a detrimental impact on output growth in terms of real GDP per capita. 
Our second sample therefore includes countries with a percentage above 80 %. This reduces 
our sample to 30 countries. Our second sample constitutes the following countries: Australia, 
Austria, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Portugal, 
Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United 
States, and Vietnam. 
 In Table 6, which is below, we present the descriptive statistics related to the chosen 
determinants of financialization. The first table explains the Financial Development sample of 
55 countries and the second is the reduced Financialization sample of 30 countries. 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of the Determinants of Financial Development  
This table presents the descriptive statistics of all the independent and dependent variables to be used in our 
models. Using a benchmark year of 2008, we define CREDIT as the the dependent variable. TRADE and 
SDGDPPC are averaged between 1980 and 2007. LEGALFOR corresponds to the year 2004, and POLITY for 
the year 2007. The statistics comes from 55 observations which is the sample of countries used.  CREDIT is the 
annual percentage of domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP). LEGALFOR is an index measuring the 
cumbersomeness of legal procedures required to do financial transactions from 1 to 7. POLITY comes from polity 
II which is a measure of the quality of democracy from -10 to 10. TRADE is the percentage of GDP which comes 
trom trade. SDGDPPC is the standard deviation of GDP per capita annual growth rate.  
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 CREDIT LEGALFOR POLITY TRADE SDGDPPC 
Mean 86.64264 3.555969 7.781818 79.48961 2.980686 
Median 83.30000 3.368421 9.000000 62.08101 2.740937 
Maximum 200.4849 6.008772 10.00000 351.5663 6.514884 
Minimum 11.02626 0.730263 -7.000000 20.29075 1.101795 
Std. Dev. 50.92736 1.117549 4.017051 61.10042 1.394762 
Skewness 0.496996 0.180942 -2.707018 2.365642 0.853011 
Kurtosis 2.288943 2.843650 9.870140 9.809407 3.090157 
Jarque-Bera 3.422883 0.356137 175.3368 157.5591 6.688547 
Probability 0.180605 0.836885 0.000000 0.000000 0.035286 
Sum 4765.345 195.5783 428.0000 4371.928 163.9378 
Sum Sq. Dev. 140054.2 67.44147 871.3818 201596.1 105.0495 
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 
 
Above we present a table of the descriptive statistics of each determinant of financial 
development. Our dependent variable, CREDIT, has a mean value of 86.64 % of GDP. This 
mean is above the threshold where financial deepening is beneficial for economic output as 
found by Arcand et al. (2015).  The country with the maximum credit is the United Kingdom, 
and the minimum Argentina. Based on the standard deviation there is wide variation among the 
countries with respect to CREDIT.   
In our sample, the country with the minimum amount of legal formalism (LEGALFOR) 
is Hong Kong and the most being Venezuela. Also, we note that there is sufficient variation of 
this variable within the sample. 
There are many countries within our sample with a high quality of democracy 
(POLITY). These countries are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and 
United States. Vietnam has the lowest quality democracy. With a mean of 7.78, we can say that 
the majority of countries in the sample have a relatively high level of democracy. 
With a mean Trade (% of GDP) of 79% our sample consists of countries who are 
relatively open to trade. Singapore being the most open to trade, and Brazil the least. However, 
the standard deviation shows that there is wide variation in this sample. 
Our data shows that Argentina has the greatest amount of macroeconomic volatility 
(SDGDPPC), with Slovenia having the least. The measure of standard deviation shows that 
there is not a large amount of variation of this variable in this sample. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of the Determinants of Financialization  
This table presents the descriptive statistics of all the independent and dependent variables to be used in our 
models. Using a benchmark year of 2008, we define CREDIT as the the dependent variable. TRADE is averaged 
between 1980 and 2007. LEGALFOR corresponds to the year 2004, and POLITY for the year 2007. The statistics 
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comes from 30 observations which is the sample of countries used.  CREDIT is the annual percentage of domestic 
credit to the private sector (% of GDP). LEGALFOR is an index measuring the cumbersomeness of legal 
procedures required to do financial transactions from 1 to 7. POLITY comes from polity II which is a measure of 
the quality of democracy from -10 to 10. TRADE is the percentage of GDP which comes from trade.  
 
 CREDIT LEGALFOR POLITY TRADE 
Mean 124.4066 3.106558 8.033333 93.53107 
Median 115.4390 3.098684 10.00000 65.35702 
Maximum 200.4849 5.837719 10.00000 351.5663 
Minimum 80.32946 0.730263 -7.000000 21.16280 
Std. Dev. 36.41833 1.022346 4.627380 74.86413 
Skewness 0.606683 0.452489 -2.557419 1.922799 
Kurtosis 2.150606 4.093984 8.318178 6.457366 
Jarque-Bera 2.742160 2.519733 68.05574 33.42750 
Probability 0.253833 0.283692 0.000000 0.000000 
Sum 3732.199 93.19674 241.0000 2805.932 
Sum Sq. Dev. 38462.55 30.31055 620.9667 162534.5 
Observations 30 30 30 30 
 
 For the dependent variable CREDIT we have high mean, which is well above the 
threshold of 80% discussed by Arcand et al. (2015).  The country with the minimum is Finland, 
and the United Kingdom the maximum. 
 In the sample we note that the mean amount of LEGALFOR is less than the financial 
development sample. This shows that there may be a tendency for highly financialized 
countries to have low legal formalism. 
 Furthermore, the mean shows that countries in this sample have a higher quality of 
democracy, POLITY. 21 out of 30 of the countries in this sample have the maximum score of 
democratic quality. With this in mind, the sample mainly consists of advanced high quality 
democracies. 
 In this sample we see that the mean trade openness, TRADE, is much higher than that 
of the general sample. Because trade openness is high in this sample, our upcoming results may 
indicate that trade has a significant positive relationship with financialization. However, there 
is more variation in trade in this sample than the previous larger sample. 
 Financial development tends to occur in countries with significant macroeconomic 
stability according to King and Levine (1993). With this reasoning, we expect that countries 
undergoing financialization are likely to be advanced and stable economies. This is 
substantiated by the fact that most studies on financialization to date has exclusively been 
focused on advanced and stable economies, such as Kripper (2005), Kus (2012), Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) and many others. Based on the literature, we expect little variation 
in macroeconomic stability among states in financialization. In this vein, we have chosen to 
omit the SDGDPPC from the financialization analysis. As you will see in table 25 In the 
appendix chapter our suspicions are correct. For financialization, this variable is very 
31 
 
insignificant based on our specification. In one of our similar studies, Herger et al. (2008), the 
authors also do not account for macroeconomic variables.  
3.1.5. Correlation Coefficients  
 In tables 34 – 37 in the appendix presents the correlations among our explanatory 
variables. These tables present the correlation coefficients among these variables. 
It is noteworthy that in Table… which cover the relationship between financial 
development and cultural dimensions we see a strong positive correlation, 0.54, between legal 
formalism (LEGALFOR) and uncertainty avoidance (UAI). We also see a strong negative 
correlation, -0.532769, between individualism (IDV) and macroeconomic volatility 
(SDGDPPC).  Among the cultural variables there seems to be a very strong negative correlation 
between power distance (PDI) and individualism (IDV). 
 Considering financial development and primary religion, there appears to be a strong 
positive correlation, 0.502752, between legal formalism and Catholicism (DCATH). Based on 
the correlation matrix it appears that there are few strong correlations when we do a correlation 
matrix with religion as a proxy of culture as opposed to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.  
 In the matrix of financialization and cultural dimensions, we once again see a strong 
negative correlation, 0.576223, between legal formalism and uncertainty avoidance.  
3.2 Methodology 
The purpose of this section is to give the reader a thorough understanding of the 
considerations and methods used to obtain our results. Thereafter, we discuss our choice of 
dependent variable. In accordance to the literature, presented below, we chose to employ 
domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). Thereafter we discuss our empirical strategy. 
Given the constraints of sample size, and considering similar studies we elected to use Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) estimation. After this section, we provide the reader the results of our 
study. 
3.2.1. Indicator of Financial Development and Financialization 
We assume based on Arcand et al. (2015) that financialization may be conceptualized 
as an advanced state of financial development. Recall that the authors definitively found that 
when domestic credit to private sector reaches between 80 - 120% of GDP, a country begin to 
experience reduce output growth. The detrimental role of this proxy is also supported by some 
recent studies by Cecchetti and Kharoubi (2012), Beck et al. (2014) and Law and Singh (2014). 
They use domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP), denoted as CREDIT in our model, as 
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the proxy for financial depth. We shall use this as a proxy for financial development and 
financialization. 
This variable was used as proxy of financial development by Herger et al. (2008). 
Domestic credit to private sector refers to the financial resources provided by the private sector 
by financial corporations. The source of this data is the World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database, (2016).  This database was developed through the work of Beck et al. 
(2000). 
3.2.2. Model Specification 
 Below we present the two models used to test our data. The first model is the Financial 
Development model and the second the Financialization model. For reasons explained in 
Chapter 3.1.4 we do not consider SDGDPPC, in the latter model. This is because there is not 
enough variation of this variable in the smaller data set to substantiate using it in this this model. 
Furthermore, as discussed the bulk of literature on financialization focuses on advanced 
economies coming from studies such as Kripper (2005) and Kus (2012), among others. In 
addition, our preliminary empirical results showed that this variable is overwhelmingly 
insignificant in the financialization model. Herger et al. (2008) do not account for 
macroeconomic variables when considering determinants of financial development.  
The four equations, which correspond to the following four objectives in the order 
presented: 
a) To ascertain the relationship and explanatory power of each of the determinants 
of financial development; 
Equation 1: Financial Development Model (Without Culture) 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
b) To discover the relationship and explanatory power of each of the four cultural 
dimensions and the difference in explanatory power with the presence of some 
measure of culture; 
Equation 2: Financial Development Model (With Culture) 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑈𝐿𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
c) To reveal the relationship and explanatory power of each of the possible 
determinants of financialization; and 
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Equation 3: Financialization Model (Without Culture) 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
d) To become aware of the relationship and explanatory power of each of the four 
cultural dimensions and the difference in explanatory power with the presence 
of some measure of culture. 
Equation 4: Financialization Model (With Culture) 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑈𝐿𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Where, CREDIT is the domestic credit to private sector (% GDP) in a country i in the year 2008; 
LEGALFOR is the index of legal formalism in a country i in the year 2004; 
POLITY is the measurement for Polity II in a country i in the year 2007; 
TRADE is trade as percent of GDP in a country i averaged for 1980-2007; 
SDGDPPC is the standard deviation of GDP per capita annual growth rate in a country i averaged for 
1980-2007; and 
CULTURE represents each of the time invariant cultural variables, Individualism (IDV), Masculinity 
(MAS), Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), and Power Distance (PDI); and for checking robustness, 
Catholic (CATH), Protestant (PROT), and Muslim (MUSL), which are dummy variables. 
3.2.3. Empirical Strategy 
 When we evaluated our empirical choices we reviewed the strategies used by the related 
studies. However, the defining factor in our decision making is that our sample is smaller than 
most of these studies. In cross-country data outliers may be detrimental to the quality of the 
results, Koenker and Bassett (1978) suggest the usage of quantile regression estimation 
technique to do empirical testing on samples with possible outliners. This methodology is used 
by Dutta and Mukherjee (2012). However, their sample included 90 countries, which is much 
more than our sample size. Furthermore, the effectiveness of this estimation technique is 
limited when the sample size is not large enough. 
Following Herger et al. (2008) we decided to use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation to estimate our equations. Using E-Views 9 we estimate our equations using OLS 
with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The next chapter presents the results of our 
study. 
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4. Results 
 
 In this chapter we present the results of our study. As discussed in the previous chapter 
we have divided our sample into two. The first sample includes all countries. The second 
includes only countries with domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) which has a 
percentage above 80%. In accordance to the findings of Arcand et al. (2015). We consider the 
previous as the Financial Development sample and the latter as the Financialization sample. 
 We introduce this chapter with a presentation of the results. Thereafter we analyse the 
results for each of the significant determinants. Special attention is paid to the significance and 
explanatory power of each cultural dimensions. Consistent with our examination of whether 
culture is a determinant of financial development and financialization. Like Dutta and 
Mukherjee (2012) we used primary religion to test robustness. 
 The tables below present the findings of our investigation. Above each table are the 
background information which relates to the model such as information about the variables, 
methodological considerations, and a guide to reading the results. 
 
Table 8: Results of the Determinants of Financial Development 
All regressions are cross-sectional. The dependent variable is domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). In 
column one the explanatory variables are listed: Legal Formalism Index (LEGALFOR), Polity II (POLITY), trade 
(% of GDP) (TRADE), and standard deviation of GDP per capita annual growth rate (SDGDPPC). The cultural 
dimensions used are listed below these determinants and they are: individualism (IDV), masculinity (MAS), 
power distance index (PDI), and uncertainty avoidance index (UAI). 
The table presents the results of five estimated equations. Equation (1) consists of only non-cultural variables. 
Equation (2) includes all non-cultural variables and the cultural variable individualism (IDV).  Equation (3) 
consists of all non-cultural variables and the cultural variable, masculinity (MAS). Equation (4) includes all non-
cultural variables and the cultural variable, power distance index (PDI). Equation (5) consist of all non-cultural 
variables and the cultural variable, uncertainty avoidance index (UAI). 
All equations have been tested using ordinary least squares estimation. They are heteroskedasticity robust applying 
HAC standard errors and covariance with the Barlett – Kernel and Newey West methods 
Coefficients pertain to standardised variables, beta coefficients, and are significant at a level of 10% level when 
labelled with *, at a level of 5% when labelled with **, and at a level of 1% when labelled with ***. The standard 
errors are in parentheses. The E-Views outputs corresponding to this table are found in the appendices. 
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Determinants of Financial Development 
Dependent Variable: Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) 
Method: Least Squares - HAC standard errors & coviariance (Barlett-Kernel, Newey West fixed bandwidth = 
4.000) 
Observations: 55 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
C 149.5607 114.2756 156.8089 168.2414 152.5594 
 (23.02753) (29.80180) (28.28013) (27.53311) (26.35187) 
      
LEGALFOR -16.49996*** -12.21943** -16.70977** -13.7140*** -15.26427*** 
 (4.843952) (5.126332) (4.926589) (4.791921) (5.438828) 
 
POLITY 
 
2.713311** 
 
1.537062 
 
2.660247** 
 
1.809172 
 
2.838446** 
 (1.185972) (1.471798) (1.214682) (1.224511) (1.247633) 
      
TRADE 0.064991 0.094117 0.060192 0.082517 0.057471 
 (0.073744) (0.068721) (0.074597) (0.072295) (0.081869) 
      
SDGDPPC -10.24102*** -7.787893* -10.15636** -7.845981** -10.26677*** 
 (3.763163) (3.896158) (3.812327) (3.785188) (3.675286) 
IDV  0.442481    
  
(0.328142) 
    
MAS   -0.119724   
   
(0.269891) 
   
PDI    -0.523939**  
    (0.244220)  
 
UAI     
 
-0.116676 
     (0.389978) 
𝑅2Adjusted 0.312396 0.321440 0.300459 0.333028 0.300609 
 
Prob (Wald F-
statistic) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Wald F-stat. 
 
13.87450 11.87468 
 
11.37916 
 
12.16696 
 
11.54549 
 
Table 9: Results of the Determinants of Financialization  
All regressions are cross-sectional. The dependent variable is domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). In 
column one the explanatory variables are listed: Legal Formalism Index (LEGALFOR), Polity II (POLITY), and 
trade (% of GDP) (TRADE). The cultural dimensions used are listed below these determinants and they are: 
individualism (IDV), masculinity (MAS), power distance index (PDI), and uncertainty avoidance index (UAI). 
The table presents the results of five estimated equations. Equation (1) consists of only non-cultural variables. 
Equation (2) includes all non-cultural variables and the cultural variable individualism (IDV).  Equation (3) 
consists of all non-cultural variables and the cultural variable, masculinity (MAS). Equation (4) includes all non-
cultural variables and the cultural variable, power distance index (PDI). Equation (5) consist of all non-cultural 
variables and the cultural variable, uncertainty avoidance index (UAI). 
All equations have been tested using ordinary least squares estimation. They are heteroskedasticity robust applying 
HAC standard errors and covariance with the Barlett – Kernel and Newey West methods 
Coefficients pertain to standardised variables, beta coefficients, and are significant at a level of 10% level when 
labelled with *, at a level of 5% when labelled with **, and at a level of 1% when labelled with ***. The standard 
errors are in parentheses. The E-Views outputs corresponding to this table are found in the appendices. 
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Determinants of Financialization 
Dependent Variable: Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) 
Method: Least Squares - HAC standard errors & coviariance (Barlett-Kernel, Newey West fixed bandwidth = 
4.000) 
Observations: 30 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    
C 159.3434 151.1781 137.7510 165.5751 162.1320    
 (20.30840) (28.25658) (20.38199) (24.60020) (21.69628)    
 
LEGALFOR 
 
-12.49837* 
 
-11.27487 
 
-11.42491* 
 
-10.52715 
 
-9.943423 
   
 (6.672483) (6.915584) (6.501887) (6.181632) (5.930576)    
 
POLITY 
 
1.924161** 
 
1.675005** 
 
2.027262*** 
 
1.513069 
 
2.173173** 
   
 (0.762722) (0.797352) (0.689725) (0.937453) (0.993061)    
 
TRADE 
 
-0.123673* 
 
-0.109777* 
 
-0.114028* 
 
-0.100202 
 
-0.137549** 
   
 (0.061264) (0.060099) (0.058119) (0.068036) (0.062663)    
IDV  0.095772       
  (0.302690)       
MAS   0.347698      
   (0.239578)      
PDI    -0.221420     
    (0.262356)     
UAI     -0.192504    
     (0.315172)    
𝑅2Adjusted 0.110590 0.077509 0.121197 0.088024 0.088455    
 
Prob(Wald F-
statistic) 0.045668 0.045765 0.041409 
 
 
0.102846 0.069186  
  
 
Wald F-stat. 3.064318 2.833370 2.918133 
 
 
2.161305 2.487456  
  
    
 
     
4.1 Determinants of Financial Development and Financialization 
Below we discuss our findings as presented by the equations that are exclusive of 
culture. For reference, labelled as equation (1) in tables 9 and 10.   
 
Table 10: Expected vs. Obtained Results for Non-Cultural Determinants of Financial 
Development and Financialization 
The table below presents the expected results and obtained results for the determinants. The results correspond to 
the equation 1 in tables 9 and 10.  If the sign is (+) the determinant has a negative impact, if the sign is (-) the 
determinant has a negative impact. If the sign is (NS), it means that the variable is not statistically significant at a 
level of 10%. Where (NA) is present, the variable does not apply to the model.  
 
Variable Expected Result Obtained Result – 
Financial Development 
Obtained Result – 
Financialization 
LEGALFOR - - - 
POLITY + + + 
TRADE + NS - 
SDGDPPC -  -  NA 
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a) Legal Formalism Index 
As expected the legal formalism index has a negative relationship with both financial 
development and financialization. This is congruent with the findings of Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) and Herger et al. (2008). It is worthwhile to note that the variable is significant 
at a level of 1% in the financial development model. But less so in financialization model, only 
at a level 10%. Essentially what this means is that legal formalism a stronger determinant of 
financial development than financialization. 
 
b) Polity II 
 Polity II is significant in both models at a level of 5% with a positive relationship. Dutta 
and Mukherjee (2012) also found this variable to be a significant determinant of financial 
development. We can conclude that the quality of a nation´s democracy is a determinant for 
financial development and financialization. Based on our results, we are also able to postulate 
that there is a greater likelihood of economies experiencing financialization to be highly 
democratic states. 
Considering the findings of North (1981) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), our 
results support the conclusion that the quality of political institutions matters in a nation´s quest 
for financial development. However, what is paradoxical is that there is a significant positive 
relationship between financialization and democracy, given that financialization is associated 
with income inequality. According to Fine (2011) and Kus (2012) income inequality is a 
prominent hallmark of societies in financialization. This paradox by definition is contradictory 
to the nature of democracy. Maybe it is the vexing nature of this contradiction that has 
instigated and intensified recent research on financialization. 
 
c) Trade Openness 
We found that based on the specification of our model trade openness does not have 
any significance of financial development. Specifically, the extension of domestic credit to the 
private sector. In Dutta and Mukherjee (2012) trade is significant with the presence of a cultural 
measure developed by Tabellini (2008), but not significant with the presence of the uncertainty 
avoidance index. In our investigation, trade openness is not significant in financial 
development but is a significant determinant of financialization. However, at a level of 10% 
significance we conclude that trade openness has a negative relationship with financialization. 
At the moment, there is not enough literature to discuss the role of trade openness in 
financialization. 
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d) Standard Deviation of GDP per capita Annual Growth Rate 
 We expected that macroeconomic volatility lends to an economic environment that is 
not conducive to financial development. This held true in our estimation. Like in Huang (2005), 
our research shows that this indicator is significant to financial development. 
4.2 Cultural Dimensions 
 Based on the existing literature, in the previous chapter we developed a series of 
hypotheses to explain our anticipated results. In this section, we examine each of our hypothesis 
and whether or not they proved correct. 
 
Table 11: Expected vs. Obtained Results for Cultural Dimensions as Determinants of Financial 
Development and Financialization  
The table below presents the expected results and obtained results of culture being a determinant of both financial 
development and financialization. Note, that the table outlines the results with the presence of each of the four 
cultural dimension.  If the sign is (+) the determinant has a negative impact, if the sign is (-) the determinant has 
a negative impact, and if the sign is (?) the impact is unknown. If the sign is (NS), it means that the variable is not 
statistically significant at a level of 10%.  
 
Cultural 
Dimension 
Expected Result – 
Financial 
Development 
Expected Result – 
Financialization 
Obtained Result – 
Financial 
Development 
Obtained Result – 
Financialization 
Individualism + + NS NS 
 
Masculinity 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
NS 
 
NS 
 
Power Distance 
 
? 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
NS 
 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
 
- 
 
- 
 
NS 
 
NS 
 
Hypothesis 1: Individualism is positively related to financial development and financialization 
because of overconfidence we expect individuals in an individualist society to be more willing 
to take financial risks. 
 Our findings illustrate that individualism does not have a significant relationship with 
neither the financial development nor financialization sample. As such, we reject our 
hypothesis. We conclude that individualism may not be a direct determinant in either event. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Masculinity is positively related to financial development and financialization 
because of overconfidence we expect individuals in a masculine society to be more willing to 
take financial risks. 
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 Our findings suggest that masculinity does not have a significant relationship with 
neither financial development nor financialization. In this vein, we reject our hypothesis. We 
conclude that masculinity may not be a direct determinant in either event. 
  
Hypothesis 3: Uncertainty Avoidance is negatively related to financial development and 
financialization because of a preference for regulation and heightened financial risk aversion 
among individuals in an uncertainty avoidant society. 
Our findings show that uncertainty avoidance does not have a significant relationship 
with neither financial development nor financialization. Our results go against that of Kwok 
and Tadesse (2006) and Dutta and Mukherjee (2012) which find that there is a significant 
negative relationship between this variable and financial development. We conclude that 
uncertainty avoidance may not be a direct determinant in either event. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between power distance and financial development is unknown. 
However, given that both power distance and financialization are positively related to income 
inequality we expect that they themselves are positively related. 
At a level of significance of 5% we conclude that power distance has a negative 
relationship with financial development. This result is surprising; given that we did not have 
any expectation of this relationship. Rinne et al. (2012) finds that there is a strong negative 
correlation between the Global Innovation Index and power distance.  Assuming that 
innovation promotes the demand for credit in the private sector we may argue that this could 
be the source of this relationship. This unexplored and unexpected relationship provides an 
opportunity for future research. Future research may consider the relationship between 
innovation, power distance, and the credit market. 
Nevertheless, our findings suggest that power distance does not have a significant 
relationship with financialization. As such, we reject our hypothesis. 
4.3 Robustness of Culture   
To check the robustness of culture being a determinant of financial development and 
financialization, we employed the usage of other cultural variables. Following Stulz and 
Williamson (2003) and Dutta and Mukherjee (2012) we evaluated primary religion as a proxy 
of national culture. In the table below we present our findings. 
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Table 12: Results of the Determinants of Financial Development (Robustness) 
All regressions are cross-sectional. The dependent variable is domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). In 
column one the explanatory variables are listed: Legal Formalism Index (LEGALFOR), Polity II (POLITY), trade 
(% of GDP) (TRADE), and standard deviation of GDP per capita annual growth rate (SDGDPPC). Dummy 
variables are used to indicate primary religion within a given country: Catholic (DCATH), Protestant (DPROT), 
and Muslim (DMUSL). 
The table presents the results of four estimated equations. Equation (1) consists of only non-cultural variables. 
Equation (2) includes all non-cultural variables and the cultural variable DCATH.  Equation (3) consists of all 
non-cultural variables and the cultural variable, DPROT. Equation (4) includes all non-cultural variables and the 
cultural variable, DMUSL. 
All equations have been tested using ordinary least squares estimation. They are heteroskedasticity robust applying 
HAC standard errors and covariance with the Barlett – Kernel and Newey West methods. 
Coefficients pertain to standardised variables, beta coefficients, and are significant at a level of 10% level when 
labelled with *, at a level of 5% when labelled with **, and at a level of 1% when labelled with ***. The standard 
errors are in parentheses. The E-Views outputs corresponding to this table are found in the appendices. 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
C 149.5607 
(23.02753) 
144.1270 135.0662 168.3050 
 (22.44657) (24.49540) (22.34850) 
 
LEGALFOR -16.49996*** -13.68419** -13.08441*** -19.38765*** 
 (4.843952) (6.691183) (4.800991) (5.474834) 
 
POLITY 
 
2.713311** 
 
2.932753** 
 
2.229355* 
 
1.968041* 
 (1.185972) (1.280258) (1.271601) (0.855248) 
 
TRADE 0.064991 0.080236 0.100267 0.026532 
 (0.073744) (0.073271) (0.087403) (0.072060) 
 
SDGDPPC -10.24102*** -11.11666** -10.19862*** -8.674281** 
 (3.763163) (4.360406) (3.618241) (3.274770) 
DCATH  -9.271405   
  (15.03591)   
DPROT   19.46092  
   (26.07163)  
DMUSL    -47.18037*** 
    (11.71189) 
𝑅2Adjusted 0.312396 0.304281 0.313452 0.369817 
 
Prob (Wald  
 
F-statistic) 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
Wald F-stat. 13.87450 11.54224 13.43451 18.31137 
 
 
Table 13: Results of the Determinants of Financialization (Robustness) 
All regressions are cross-sectional. The dependent variable is domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). In 
column one the explanatory variables are listed: Legal Formalism Index (LEGALFOR), Polity II (POLITY), and 
trade (% of GDP) (TRADE). Dummy variables are used to indicate primary religion within a given country: 
Catholic (DCATH), Protestant (DPROT), and Muslim (DMUSL). 
The table presents the results of four estimated equations. Equation (1) consists of only non-cultural variables. 
Equation (2) includes all non-cultural variables and the cultural variable DCATH.  Equation (3) consists of all 
non-cultural variables and the cultural variable, DPROT. Equation (4) includes all non-cultural variables and the 
cultural variable, DMUSL. 
All equations have been tested using ordinary least squares estimation. They are heteroskedasticity robust applying 
HAC standard errors and covariance with the Barlett – Kernel and Newey West methods. 
Coefficients pertain to standardised variables, beta coefficients, and are significant at a level of 10% level when 
labelled with *, at a level of 5% when labelled with **, and at a level of 1% when labelled with ***. The standard 
errors are in parentheses. The E-Views outputs corresponding to this table are found in the appendices. 
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Variable 1 2 3 4 
C 159.3434 159.3831 157.0416 160.2163 
 (20.30840) (19.72662) (19.11594) (20.30831) 
 
LEGALFOR -12.49837* -12.51376* -11.98341* -13.23448* 
 (6.672483) (6.651410) (6.057836) (6.717445) 
 
POLITY 1.924161** 1.922526** 1.860874** 2.085113*** 
 (0.762722) (0.880149) (0.703214) (0.746949) 
 
TRADE -0.123673* -0.123750* -0.117833* -0.109719* 
 (0.061264) (0.057725) (0.060711) (0.059173) 
DCATH  0.065450   
  (10.52187) 
 
  
DPROT   2.491011  
   (17.20670) 
 
 
 
DMUSL 
 
   -35.52911*** 
(7.561154) 
𝑅2Adjusted 0.110590 0.075014 0.075723 0.109847 
 
Prob (Wald F-
statistic) 
 
0.045668 
 
0.051575 
 
0.026494 
 
0.000061 
Wald F-stat. 3.064318 2.732632 3.302339 9.901335 
 
 
 Based on the literature, we developed three hypotheses to explain our expectations of 
our robustness checks. The table and text below examines our findings. 
 
 
Table 14: Expected vs. Obtained Results for Cultural Dimensions as Determinants of Financial 
Development and Financialization 
The table below presents the expected results and obtained results of culture being a determinant of both financial 
development and financialization. Note, that the table outlines the results with the presence of each of the three 
primary religions listed.  If the sign is (+) the determinant has a negative impact, if the sign is (-) the determinant 
has a negative impact, and if the sign is (?) the impact is unknown. If the sign is (NS), it means that the variable 
is not statistically significant at a level of 10%. The correlation matrices corresponding to these findings are found 
in the appendices section of this document. 
 
Primary Religion Expected Result – 
Financial 
Development 
Expected Result – 
Financialization 
Obtained Result – 
Financial 
Development 
Obtained Result – 
Financialization 
Catholic -  -  NS NS 
 
Protestant 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
NS 
 
NS 
 
Muslim 
 
-  
 
-  
 
- 
 
-  
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Hypothesis 5: Catholicism is negatively related to financial development and financialization 
because of weaker protection of creditors’ rights in populations with a high Catholic population 
which is detrimental to credit market development.   
  We find that Catholicism does not have a significant relationship with financial 
development or financialization. This goes against Stulz and Williamson (2003) which found 
it to be significant. Given our findings, we reject this hypothesis.   
 
Hypothesis 6: Protestantism is positively related to financial development and financialization 
because of strong protection of creditors’ rights in populations with a high Protestant 
population which is helpful for the development of credit markets. 
 We conclude based on our results that Protestantism does not have a significant 
relationship with financial development or financialization. This goes against Stulz and 
Williamson (2003) which found it to be significant. Given our findings, we reject this 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Islam is negatively related to financial development and financialization because 
states with high Islamic populations tend to have poor quality government which reduces 
investor confidence.   
 Our findings suggest that Islam has a strong negative relationship with both financial 
development and financialization. This may be due to the findings of La Porta et al. (1999) 
which concludes that countries with large proportions of Muslims tend to suffer from low 
quality of government. Considering that the quality of institutions is fundamental for financial 
development as explained by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), we are comfortable accepting this 
hypothesis. 
4.4 Summary of Results 
 In the sections above in this chapter we present all of our findings. The aim of this 
research was to find if there is a relationship between financialization and national culture. The 
following is a brief summary of our results: 
a) There is no significant relationship between any of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and 
financialization. 
b) There is a significant negative relationship between power distance and financial 
development. 
c) There is a strong and significant negative relationship between Islam and financial 
development. 
d) There is a strong and significant negative relationship between Islam and financialization. 
43 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Recalling our research question we conclude that national culture is a determinant of 
financialization. However, the path to this conclusion was challenging and the element of 
national culture was only revealed in our checks for robustness. 
Our pioneering research into culture and financialization met many challenges. But it 
is within these immense difficulties that we found opportunities to contribute to the extant 
literature. Among the conventional challenges, we conducted our research with a relatively 
small sample size. This is because of the decision to use Hofstede (1980) cultural dimensions. 
We had to make the trade - off between getting as many dimensions as possible with as many 
countries as possible. The reason why we would have preferred a larger sample size is because 
it would have allowed us to use the quantile regression estimation method as proposed by 
Koenker and Bassett (1978) to manage the impact of outliers in our analysis. 
A critical challenge that we met is the absolute dearth of empirical studies looking into 
the determinants of financialization. There was also a lack of reliable empirically proven 
proxies of financialization. In the future more empirical work not just theoretical work needs 
to be done to measure financialization and to evaluate its possible determinants. Our 
contribution to the burgeoning literature is that this work is one of the first which proposes a 
proxy for financialization as well as possible determinants. Our results indicate that legal 
formalism, the quality of political institutions, and macroeconomic stability are all significant 
determinants of financialization and financial development. The pioneering nature of our 
findings provides multiple possibilities for future investigation. 
The lack of previous empirical studies on the determinants of financialization was a 
challenge that we surmounted with keen analysis of the literature and scholarly reasoning. 
Using Arcand et al. (2015) ground-breaking research which found that between levels of 80% 
- 120% of GDP, domestic credit to private sector becomes detrimental to economic output we 
were able to construct the dichotomy between financial development and financialization. This 
coincides with one of the most glaring and defining feature of financialization which is the 
proliferation and extension of credit in all aspects of society. This is outlined in a clear manner 
by Sawyer (2013). Knowing this feature of financialization we were comfortable enough to 
employ credit to private sector (% of GDP) as a proxy of financialization. In addition, the extant 
literature on financial development use this variable as an indicator for financial development. 
Considering the findings of Arcand et al. (2015), we were also able to get a possible point in 
which financial development becomes detrimental. We assumed this detrimental phase to be 
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financialization. Using this point, we divided our sample into two for the purpose of empirical 
analysis. One being a general financial development group inclusive of all countries in our 
sample, and one with countries whose domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) exceeds 
80%. By proposing that this macroeconomic indicator is a proxy of financialization, we assist 
future researchers who assume the duty of bringing the concept of financialization more deeply 
into the realms of empirical research. 
Credit to private sector, (% GDP) is a proxy of the financial development depth. Within 
this classification this study does not include other possible indicators which may be proxies 
of financial development and financialization. Further studies could investigate this same topic 
by using not only indicators of depth, but indicators of activity. An example of such activity is 
the turnover ratio, which alludes to the speculation element of financial hyperactivity.  
Furthermore, with respect to the aforementioned proxy, the study does not make a clear 
delineation between market-based and bank-based systems. The nature of the proxy employed 
means that both systems are captured to some degree. However, future research may consider 
using proxies specific to banking and specific to markets.  
The study used the widely accepted and employed Hofstede’s cultural dimensions for 
testing the impact of culture on financial development and financialization. However, our 
empirical analysis showed that none of these dimensions have a significant relationship with 
financialization. However, we did discover that power distance has a significant negative 
relationship with financial development. This relationship was not expected, because to date 
the literature has not delved into the role of power distance in financial development. 
 We did consider that using Hofstede (1980) cultural dimensions may have not been the 
best variables to express the role of culture in financial development and financialization. 
Nevertheless, given that this is the first known study of its kind to use all of these variables we 
consider this a significant contribution to the extant literature. However, we found it prudent to 
check the robustness of culture being a determinant. This involved finding alternative cultural 
variables. Following Stulz and Williamson (2003), we evaluated the role of primary religion in 
financial development and financialization. In the related literature, we found that primary 
religion is often used. Our results clearly illustrate that Islam has a strong and significant 
negative relationship with both events. 
Courtesy of our findings on the role of a Muslim population, we were able to conclude 
that culture has some influence on financialization. In our research it is clear that having Islam 
as a primary religion mitigates the degree of financialization within a state. We propose that 
future research should investigate the nature of the relationship between Islam and 
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Financialization. This would involve researching the aspects of Islamic theology that 
influences attitudes towards the extension of credit and the structuring of credit - based 
transactions. In this vein, our work and possible follow-up work may be a contribution to the 
literature of not only cultural finance but also Islamic finance. 
We do admit that this study ignores the possible cross-causality of national culture and 
financial development and financialization. Using the theoretical framework that we have 
established in this document, future research could build upon this work with more advanced 
econometric techniques to account for this possibility.  
To conclude, culture matters. Given that finance is a member of the social sciences, we 
cannot ignore the role of culture in financial decision making and financial events. Though the 
literature focused on theme of this dissertation is in its infancy, we hope that our analysis has 
provided enough impetus and information to stimulate future investigations. 
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Appendix: 
 
 
Table 15: Cultural Dimensions Values of Each Country  
This table captures the four cultural dimension values for each country within our sample. Considerations with 
respect to the scoring and period of this is found in the text above. 
 
COUNTRY IDV MAS PDI UAI 
Argentina 46 56 49 86 
Australia 90 61 38 51 
Austria 55 79 11 70 
Bangladesh 20 55 80 60 
Belgium 75 54 65 94 
Brazil 38 49 69 76 
Bulgaria 30 40 70 85 
Canada 80 52 39 48 
Chile 23 28 63 86 
China 20 66 80 30 
Colombia 13 64 67 80 
Costa Rica 15 21 35 86 
Croatia 33 40 73 80 
Czech Republic 58 57 57 74 
Denmark 74 16 18 23 
Ecuador 8 63 78 67 
El Salvador 19 40 66 94 
Finland 63 26 33 59 
France 71 43 68 86 
Greece 35 57 60 100 
Hong Kong 25 57 68 29 
Hungary 80 88 46 82 
India 48 56 77 40 
Indonesia 14 46 78 48 
Ireland 70 68 28 35 
Israel 54 47 13 81 
Italy 76 70 50 75 
Jamaica 39 68 45 13 
Japan 46 95 54 92 
Luxembourg 60 50 40 70 
Malaysia 26 50 100 36 
Malta 59 47 56 96 
Mexico 30 69 81 82 
Netherlands 80 14 38 53 
New Zealand 79 58 22 49 
Norway 69 8 31 50 
Pakistan 14 50 55 70 
Panama 11 44 95 86 
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Peru 16 42 64 87 
Philippines 32 64 94 44 
Poland 60 64 68 93 
Portugal 27 31 63 100 
Romania 30 42 90 90 
Singapore 20 48 74 8 
Slovenia 27 19 71 88 
South Korea 18 39 60 85 
Spain 51 42 57 86 
Sweden 71 5 31 29 
Switzerland 68 70 34 58 
Thailand 20 34 64 64 
Turkey 37 45 66 85 
United Kingdom 89 66 35 35 
United States 91 62 40 46 
Venezuela 12 73 81 76 
Vietnam 20 40 70 30 
 
Table 16: Determinants of Financial Development Results (Preliminary Variables) 
 
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 55    
Included observations: 55   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 125.2651 29.04098 4.313390 0.0001 
BRLAW -2.976540 13.15711 -0.226231 0.8220 
FRLAW 4.048094 11.31661 0.357713 0.7222 
POLITY 4.080828 0.944609 4.320123 0.0001 
LEGALFOR -13.96132 5.765543 -2.421511 0.0195 
ETHNIC -45.94317 21.61406 -2.125615 0.0391 
LAND -14.09785 15.17630 -0.928939 0.3579 
SDGDPPC -9.826887 4.119282 -2.385582 0.0213 
AVGGDPG 7.569239 3.654746 2.071071 0.0441 
TRADE 0.048902 0.096407 0.507242 0.6145 
     
     R-squared 0.456476    Mean dependent var 86.64264 
Adjusted R-squared 0.347771    S.D. dependent var 50.92736 
S.E. of regression 41.12928    Akaike info criterion 10.43428 
Sum squared resid 76122.79    Schwarz criterion 10.79925 
Log likelihood -276.9428    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.57542 
F-statistic 4.199228    Durbin-Watson stat 1.696040 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000550    Wald F-statistic 15.44812 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 17: Determinants of Financial Development Results  
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 55    
Included observations: 55   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 149.5607 23.02753 6.494863 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -16.49996 4.843952 -3.406301 0.0013 
POLITY 2.713311 1.185972 2.287837 0.0264 
TRADE 0.064991 0.073744 0.881300 0.3824 
SDGDPPC -10.24102 3.763163 -2.721387 0.0089 
     
     
R-squared 0.363329    Mean dependent var 86.64264 
Adjusted R-squared 0.312396    S.D. dependent var 50.92736 
S.E. of regression 42.22994    Akaike info criterion 10.41064 
Sum squared resid 89168.38    Schwarz criterion 10.59313 
Log likelihood -281.2927    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.48121 
F-statistic 7.133386    Durbin-Watson stat 1.931125 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000126    Wald F-statistic 13.87450 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Table 18: Financial Development and Individualism Results  
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 55    
Included observations: 55   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 114.2756 29.80180 3.834519 0.0004 
LEGALFOR -12.21943 5.126332 -2.383660 0.0211 
POLITY 1.537062 1.471798 1.044343 0.3015 
TRADE 0.094117 0.068721 1.369546 0.1771 
SDGDPPC -7.787893 3.896158 -1.998864 0.0512 
IDV 0.442481 0.328142 1.348442 0.1837 
     
     
R-squared 0.384270    Mean dependent var 86.64264 
Adjusted R-squared 0.321440    S.D. dependent var 50.92736 
S.E. of regression 41.95128    Akaike info criterion 10.41356 
Sum squared resid 86235.60    Schwarz criterion 10.63255 
Log likelihood -280.3730    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.49825 
F-statistic 6.116059    Durbin-Watson stat 1.911579 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000178    Wald F-statistic 11.87468 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 19: Financial Development and Masculinity Results  
 
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 55    
Included observations: 55   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 156.8089 28.28013 5.544843 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -16.70977 4.926589 -3.391753 0.0014 
POLITY 2.660247 1.214682 2.190077 0.0333 
TRADE 0.060192 0.074597 0.806889 0.4236 
SDGDPPC -10.15636 3.812327 -2.664085 0.0104 
MAS -0.119724 0.269891 -0.443600 0.6593 
     
     
R-squared 0.365231    Mean dependent var 86.64264 
Adjusted R-squared 0.300459    S.D. dependent var 50.92736 
S.E. of regression 42.59491    Akaike info criterion 10.44402 
Sum squared resid 88902.01    Schwarz criterion 10.66300 
Log likelihood -281.2104    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.52870 
F-statistic 5.638694    Durbin-Watson stat 1.944212 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000350    Wald F-statistic 11.37916 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Table 20: Financial Development and Power Distance Results  
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 55    
Included observations: 55   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 168.2414 27.53311 6.110510 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -13.71401 4.791921 -2.861902 0.0062 
POLITY 1.809172 1.224511 1.477465 0.1460 
TRADE 0.082517 0.072295 1.141405 0.2592 
SDGDPPC -7.845981 3.785188 -2.072811 0.0435 
PDI -0.523939 0.244220 -2.145354 0.0369 
     
     
R-squared 0.394785    Mean dependent var 86.64264 
Adjusted R-squared 0.333028    S.D. dependent var 50.92736 
S.E. of regression 41.59153    Akaike info criterion 10.39634 
Sum squared resid 84762.93    Schwarz criterion 10.61532 
Log likelihood -279.8993    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.48102 
F-statistic 6.392585    Durbin-Watson stat 1.947664 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000121    Wald F-statistic 12.16696 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 21: Financial Development and Uncertainty Avoidance Results  
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 55    
Included observations: 55   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 152.5594 26.35187 5.789318 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -15.26427 5.438828 -2.806536 0.0072 
POLITY 2.838446 1.247633 2.275065 0.0273 
TRADE 0.057471 0.081869 0.701993 0.4860 
SDGDPPC -10.26677 3.675286 -2.793461 0.0074 
UAI -0.116676 0.389978 -0.299185 0.7661 
     
     
R-squared 0.365367    Mean dependent var 86.64264 
Adjusted R-squared 0.300609    S.D. dependent var 50.92736 
S.E. of regression 42.59035    Akaike info criterion 10.44380 
Sum squared resid 88882.95    Schwarz criterion 10.66278 
Log likelihood -281.2045    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.52848 
F-statistic 5.642005    Durbin-Watson stat 1.949539 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000348    Wald F-statistic 11.54549 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table 22: Financial Development and Catholicism Results  
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 55    
Included observations: 55   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 144.1270 22.44657 6.420890 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -13.68419 6.691183 -2.045107 0.0462 
POLITY 2.932753 1.280258 2.290752 0.0263 
TRADE 0.080236 0.073271 1.095061 0.2788 
SDGDPPC -11.11666 4.360406 -2.549455 0.0140 
DCATH -9.271405 15.03591 -0.616618 0.5403 
     
     
R-squared 0.368700    Mean dependent var 86.64264 
Adjusted R-squared 0.304281    S.D. dependent var 50.92736 
S.E. of regression 42.47839    Akaike info criterion 10.43854 
Sum squared resid 88416.26    Schwarz criterion 10.65752 
Log likelihood -281.0598    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.52322 
F-statistic 5.723512    Durbin-Watson stat 1.958427 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000310    Wald F-statistic 11.54224 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 23: Financial Development and Protestantism Results  
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 55    
Included observations: 55   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 135.0662 24.49540 5.513942 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -13.08441 4.800991 -2.725356 0.0089 
POLITY 2.229355 1.271601 1.753187 0.0858 
TRADE 0.100267 0.087403 1.147176 0.2569 
SDGDPPC -10.19862 3.618241 -2.818669 0.0069 
DPROT 19.46092 26.07163 0.746440 0.4590 
     
     
R-squared 0.377021    Mean dependent var 86.64264 
Adjusted R-squared 0.313452    S.D. dependent var 50.92736 
S.E. of regression 42.19749    Akaike info criterion 10.42527 
Sum squared resid 87250.76    Schwarz criterion 10.64425 
Log likelihood -280.6948    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.50995 
F-statistic 5.930876    Durbin-Watson stat 1.989329 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000231    Wald F-statistic 13.43451 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table 24: Financial Development and Islam Results  
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 55    
Included observations: 55   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 168.3050 22.34850 7.530930 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -19.38765 5.474834 -3.541231 0.0009 
POLITY 1.968041 0.855248 2.301136 0.0257 
TRADE 0.026532 0.072060 0.368201 0.7143 
SDGDPPC -8.674281 3.274770 -2.648821 0.0108 
DMUSL -47.18037 11.71189 -4.028418 0.0002 
     
     
R-squared 0.428167    Mean dependent var 86.64264 
Adjusted R-squared 0.369817    S.D. dependent var 50.92736 
S.E. of regression 40.42822    Akaike info criterion 10.33960 
Sum squared resid 80087.62    Schwarz criterion 10.55858 
Log likelihood -278.3391    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.42428 
F-statistic 7.337867    Durbin-Watson stat 1.846604 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000034    Wald F-statistic 18.31137 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 25: Determinants of Financialization Results (Preliminary) 
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1 30   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 158.2294 19.67922 8.040429 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -12.75994 7.496007 -1.702232 0.1011 
POLITY 1.955750 0.715698 2.732649 0.0114 
TRADE -0.130501 0.054787 -2.381979 0.0251 
SDGDPPC 0.922867 5.748489 0.160541 0.8737 
     
     
R-squared 0.203042    Mean dependent var 124.4066 
Adjusted R-squared 0.075529    S.D. dependent var 36.41833 
S.E. of regression 35.01602    Akaike info criterion 10.10050 
Sum squared resid 30653.04    Schwarz criterion 10.33403 
Log likelihood -146.5075    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.17521 
F-statistic 1.592319    Durbin-Watson stat 1.910625 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.207350    Wald F-statistic 2.395246 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.077345    
     
     
 
Table 26: Determinants of Financialization Results  
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1 30   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 159.3434 20.30840 7.846181 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -12.49837 6.672483 -1.873122 0.0723 
POLITY 1.924161 0.762722 2.522757 0.0181 
TRADE -0.123673 0.061264 -2.018694 0.0539 
     
     
R-squared 0.202598    Mean dependent var 124.4066 
Adjusted R-squared 0.110590    S.D. dependent var 36.41833 
S.E. of regression 34.34559    Akaike info criterion 10.03439 
Sum squared resid 30670.12    Schwarz criterion 10.22122 
Log likelihood -146.5159    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.09416 
F-statistic 2.201960    Durbin-Watson stat 1.901476 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.111825    Wald F-statistic 3.064318 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.045668    
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Table 27: Financialization and Individualism Results  
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1 30   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 151.1781 28.25658 5.350190 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -11.27487 6.915584 -1.630357 0.1156 
POLITY 1.675005 0.797352 2.100711 0.0459 
TRADE -0.109777 0.060099 -1.826623 0.0797 
IDV 0.095772 0.302690 0.316402 0.7543 
     
     
R-squared 0.204749    Mean dependent var 124.4066 
Adjusted R-squared 0.077509    S.D. dependent var 36.41833 
S.E. of regression 34.97850    Akaike info criterion 10.09836 
Sum squared resid 30587.39    Schwarz criterion 10.33189 
Log likelihood -146.4753    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.17307 
F-statistic 1.609152    Durbin-Watson stat 1.892298 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.203084    Wald F-statistic 2.833370 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.045765    
     
     
 
 
 
Table 28: Financialization and Masculinity Results  
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1 30   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 137.7510 20.38199 6.758468 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -11.42491 6.501887 -1.757168 0.0911 
POLITY 2.027262 0.689725 2.939230 0.0070 
TRADE -0.114028 0.058119 -1.961997 0.0610 
MAS 0.347698 0.239578 1.451297 0.1591 
     
     
R-squared 0.242411    Mean dependent var 124.4066 
Adjusted R-squared 0.121197    S.D. dependent var 36.41833 
S.E. of regression 34.14017    Akaike info criterion 10.04984 
Sum squared resid 29138.78    Schwarz criterion 10.28337 
Log likelihood -145.7476    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.12455 
F-statistic 1.999861    Durbin-Watson stat 1.780558 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.125383    Wald F-statistic 2.918133 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.041409    
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Table 29: Financialization and Power Distance Results  
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1 30   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 165.5751 24.60020 6.730639 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -10.52715 6.181632 -1.702972 0.1010 
POLITY 1.513069 0.937453 1.614021 0.1191 
TRADE -0.100202 0.068036 -1.472789 0.1533 
PDI -0.221420 0.262356 -0.843969 0.4067 
     
     
R-squared 0.213814    Mean dependent var 124.4066 
Adjusted R-squared 0.088024    S.D. dependent var 36.41833 
S.E. of regression 34.77857    Akaike info criterion 10.08689 
Sum squared resid 30238.72    Schwarz criterion 10.32042 
Log likelihood -146.3034    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.16160 
F-statistic 1.699771    Durbin-Watson stat 1.894199 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.181572    Wald F-statistic 2.161305 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.102846    
     
 
 
 
 
Table 30: Financialization and Uncertainty Avoidance Results  
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1 30   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 162.1320 21.69628 7.472803 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -9.943423 5.930576 -1.676637 0.1061 
POLITY 2.173173 0.993061 2.188359 0.0382 
TRADE -0.137549 0.062663 -2.195064 0.0377 
UAI -0.192504 0.315172 -0.610789 0.5469 
     
     
R-squared 0.214186    Mean dependent var 124.4066 
Adjusted R-squared 0.088455    S.D. dependent var 36.41833 
S.E. of regression 34.77034    Akaike info criterion 10.08642 
Sum squared resid 30224.42    Schwarz criterion 10.31995 
Log likelihood -146.2963    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.16113 
F-statistic 1.703533    Durbin-Watson stat 2.017203 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.180730    Wald F-statistic 2.487456 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.069186    
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Table 31: Financialization and Protestantism Results 
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1 30   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 157.0416 19.11594 8.215215 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -11.98341 6.057836 -1.978168 0.0590 
POLITY 1.860874 0.703214 2.646241 0.0139 
TRADE -0.117833 0.060711 -1.940876 0.0636 
DPROT 2.491011 17.20670 0.144770 0.8861 
     
     
R-squared 0.203209    Mean dependent var 124.4066 
Adjusted R-squared 0.075723    S.D. dependent var 36.41833 
S.E. of regression 35.01235    Akaike info criterion 10.10029 
Sum squared resid 30646.61    Schwarz criterion 10.33382 
Log likelihood -146.5044    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.17500 
F-statistic 1.593965    Durbin-Watson stat 1.918345 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.206929    Wald F-statistic 3.302339 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.026494    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 32: Financialization and Catholicism Results 
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1 30   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 159.3831 19.72662 8.079599 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -12.51376 6.651410 -1.881369 0.0716 
POLITY 1.922526 0.880149 2.184319 0.0385 
TRADE -0.123750 0.057725 -2.143786 0.0420 
DCATH 0.065450 10.52187 0.006220 0.9951 
     
     
R-squared 0.202598    Mean dependent var 124.4066 
Adjusted R-squared 0.075014    S.D. dependent var 36.41833 
S.E. of regression 35.02576    Akaike info criterion 10.10106 
Sum squared resid 30670.09    Schwarz criterion 10.33459 
Log likelihood -146.5158    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.17577 
F-statistic 1.587958    Durbin-Watson stat 1.900429 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.208470    Wald F-statistic 2.732632 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.051575    
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Table 33: Financialization and Islam Results 
Dependent Variable: CREDIT   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1 30   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 160.2163 20.30831 7.889201 0.0000 
LEGALFOR -13.23448 6.717445 -1.970165 0.0600 
POLITY 2.085113 0.746949 2.791506 0.0099 
TRADE -0.109719 0.059173 -1.854199 0.0755 
DMUSL -35.52911 7.561154 -4.698901 0.0001 
     
     
R-squared 0.232626    Mean dependent var 124.4066 
Adjusted R-squared 0.109847    S.D. dependent var 36.41833 
S.E. of regression 34.35995    Akaike info criterion 10.06267 
Sum squared resid 29515.15    Schwarz criterion 10.29620 
Log likelihood -145.9401    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.13738 
F-statistic 1.894663    Durbin-Watson stat 1.875139 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.142732    Wald F-statistic 9.901335 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000061    
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Table 34: Correlation Matrix - Financial Development and Cultural Dimensions 
 LEGALFOR POLITY TRADE SDGDPPC IDV MAS PDI UAI 
LEGALFOR 1.000000 0.073223 -0.304111 0.474449 -0.497221 -0.046595 0.368636 0.540959 
POLITY 0.073223 1.000000 -0.016398 -0.023421 0.403921 -0.101414 -0.314156 0.214976 
TRADE -0.304111 -0.016398 1.000000 0.063320 -0.055754 -0.093717 0.035468 -0.312516 
SDGDPPC 0.474449 -0.023421 0.063320 1.000000 -0.532769 -0.002995 0.446176 0.203124 
IDV -0.497221 0.403921 -0.055754 -0.532769 1.000000 0.081627 -0.668115 -0.183329 
MAS -0.046595 -0.101414 -0.093717 -0.002995 0.081627 1.000000 0.090932 0.019134 
PDI 0.368636 -0.314156 0.035468 0.446176 -0.668115 0.090932 1.000000 0.169030 
UAI 0.540959 0.214976 -0.312516 0.203124 -0.183329 0.019134 0.169030 1.000000 
 
Table 35: Correlation Matrix - Financial Development and Primary Religion 
 LEGALFOR POLITY TRADE SDGDPPC DCATH DPROT DMUSL 
LEGALFOR 1.000000 0.073223 -0.304111 0.474449 0.502752 -0.419399 -0.123825 
POLITY 0.073223 1.000000 -0.016398 -0.023421 0.240878 0.234152 -0.236896 
TRADE -0.304111 -0.016398 1.000000 0.063320 -0.025103 -0.141784 -0.086274 
SDGDPPC 0.474449 -0.023421 0.063320 1.000000 0.066362 -0.282437 0.042039 
DCATH 0.502752 0.240878 -0.025103 0.066362 1.000000 -0.467148 -0.333974 
DPROT -0.419399 0.234152 -0.141784 -0.282437 -0.467148 1.000000 -0.139876 
DMUSL -0.123825 -0.236896 -0.086274 0.042039 -0.333974 -0.139876 1.000000 
 
Table 36: Correlation Matrix - Financialization and Cultural Dimensions 
 LEGALFOR POLITY TRADE IDV MAS PDI UAI 
LEGALFOR 1.000000 0.112411 -0.236692 -0.351166 -0.132885 0.282839 0.576223 
POLITY 0.112411 1.000000 -0.133534 0.462018 -0.068333 -0.389973 0.305642 
TRADE -0.236692 -0.133534 1.000000 -0.360444 -0.054030 0.313162 -0.349300 
IDV -0.351166 0.462018 -0.360444 1.000000 0.051954 -0.758201 -0.168788 
MAS -0.132885 -0.068333 -0.054030 0.051954 1.000000 0.023966 0.104600 
PDI 0.282839 -0.389973 0.313162 -0.758201 0.023966 1.000000 0.146542 
UAI 0.576223 0.305642 -0.349300 -0.168788 0.104600 0.146542 1.000000 
 
Table 37: Correlation Matrix - Financialization and Primary Religion 
 LEGALFOR POLITY TRADE DCATH DPROT DMUSL 
LEGALFOR 1.000000 0.112411 -0.236692 0.461309 -0.348149 -0.141226 
POLITY 0.112411 1.000000 -0.133534 0.259729 0.260670 0.080271 
TRADE -0.236692 -0.133534 1.000000 0.031171 -0.313890 0.173173 
DCATH 0.461309 0.259729 0.031171 1.000000 -0.527328 -0.162386 
DPROT -0.348149 0.260670 -0.313890 -0.527328 1.000000 -0.111979 
DMUSL -0.141226 0.080271 0.173173 -0.162386 -0.111979 1.000000 
 
 
 
